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Executive Summary 
1. The relationship between the quality of health care and the extent of competition amongst 
providers has been the subject of intense policy interest and debate.  As part of the ESHCRU 
programme we are undertaking a set of related investigations into this relationship in the hospital 
sector, in primary care (general practices) and in social care.  In this initial report on competition 
amongst hospitals we  
 
 review the theoretical economics literature on competition and quality,  
 briefly describe the relevant empirical literature on 
o whether choice of hospital is influenced by quality 
o whether greater competition is associated with higher quality  
 report on preliminary empirical analyses of  
o the correlations amongst 16 hospital quality measures  
o the association between distance based measures of competition and these quality 
measures.   
We conclude by describing our future research suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature 
reviews and our initial empirical analyses.   
 
2.  The review of the theoretical literature suggests that the plausible argument that greater 
competition amongst providers facing fixed prices will lead to higher quality rests on strong 
assumptions which may not hold.  The literature shows that more competition increases quality 
when providers are profit maximisers and marginal cost of treatment is constant. Competition has 
an ambiguous or negative effect on quality when providers are altruistic, the marginal cost of 
treatment is increasing and quality is only imperfectly observable. The literature has been largely 
silent on the relationship between market size, as measured by total population or population 
density, and quality.  
 
3.  If the choice of hospital by patients and their advisors does not respond to hospital quality then 
hospitals will not gain extra revenue from improving their quality relative to their rivals.   Our review 
of the small number of studies of the influence of quality on the choice of hospital suggests that 
most studies find that demand does respond to quality after controlling for other factors including 
distance and waiting times. The quality measures ranged from standardised mortality for specific 
conditions to general hospital reputation as evaluated by health care professionals.  
 
4. We reviewed the only empirical evidence to date on competition and quality in the NHS. These 
five papers focussed primarily on mortality rates for patients admitted with acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI). The use of AMI mortality for emergency admissions as a quality measure is justified 
by its correlation with other measures of quality expected to influence demand for elective care. The 
papers report that competition raises quality when prices are fixed but reduces it when prices are 
market determined by providers or by negotiation between providers and purchasers.  
 
5. We found, using Dr Foster data for 2008/9, that in general different quality measures are not 
highly correlated and often not correlated at all. This suggests that focusing on any single quality 
measure may lead to a partial picture of the association of quality and competition. 
 
6.  Our initial cross-section investigation of the association between competition and quality 
suggests that the direction and strength of the association depends on the quality measure: there is 
a negative association between competition and some mortality indicators but not others, a positive 
iv  CHE Research Paper 80 
association between competition and some readmission rates but not others, and a negative 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?satisfaction. The association is also sensitive to how 
market size and London factors are entered into the analysis.   
 
7.  Our initial investigations suggest that further theoretical and empirical modelling is required. 
Theory models need extending, in particular to investigate the implications of market size, and to 
use this analysis to inform further empirical analysis.  Although the simple cross section associations 
in our initial empirical work do not test for causality, the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
measures of quality and the specification of the models raises the possibility that the results in 
previous studies employing other methods may also not be robust. We plan to use data from 
Hospital Episode Statistics linked with other socio-economic and administrative data sets to 
construct additional quality and competition measures and to use panel data methods to investigate 
the relationship between competition and quality.   
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1. Introduction  
The relationship between quality of health care and competition amongst providers has been the 
subject of intense policy debate.  As part of the ESCHRU programme we are investigating the 
relationship in three sectors: hospital care, primary care (general practice) and social care (nursing 
and residential homes).   
 
In this interim report on hospital competition and quality we start by reviewing the predictions and 
key assumptions of the theoretical economics literature (Section 2). We discuss the conditions under 
which greater competition will lead to higher quality.  We note that the literature has been largely 
silent on the relationship between market size, as measured by total population or population 
density, and quality. We set out a simple model in the Appendix which suggests that neglect of 
market size can bias estimates of the effect of competition, as conventionally measured, on quality.  
 
We review the empirical literature in section 3, restricting attention to studies in the NHS hospital 
sector. This literature primarily uses mortality rates for patients admitted with acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) as the quality indicator and reports that that competition raises quality when prices 
are fixed but reduces it when prices are market determined by providers or by negotiation between 
providers and purchasers. We discuss the strengths of the evidence in the literature, focussing here 
on the argument that, although competition is expected to operate via the demand for elective care, 
use of AMI mortality for emergency admissions as a quality measure can be justified if it is correlated 
with other measures of quality expected to influence demand for elective care.  
 
A large number of hospital quality indicators are available.  In section 4 we report on our 
investigation of the extent to which different quality indicators are correlated within hospitals. Using 
Dr Foster data for 2008/9 we find that in general different quality measures are not highly correlated 
and often not correlated at all. This suggests that focusing on any single quality measure may lead to 
a partial picture of the association between quality and competition.  
 
In section 5 we report on an initial investigation of the robustness of estimates of the cross section 
association between competition and quality.  After controlling for whether a hospital is a 
Foundation Trust or a teaching hospital, we find that the direction and strength of the association 
depends on the quality measure: there is a negative association between competition and some 
mortality indicators but not others, a positive association between competition and some 
ƌĞĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƌĂƚĞƐ ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ Ă ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
satisfaction. The association is also sensitive to whether we allow for whether a hospital is in or 
outside London and allow the association to differ for London and non-London hospitals.  Finally, as 
suggested by our simple theoretical model, the association between competition and quality is 
sensitive to whether and how measures of competition incorporate the population density or total 
population around providers.   
 
Section 6 outlines our plans for further work.  Simple cross section associations do not establish 
causality and the empirical literature discussed in section 3 has been careful to use other statistical 
methods (difference in differences and instrumental variables) which are more likely to identify 
causal relationships. However, the sensitivity of simple cross-section associations to the choice of 
quality measure, to allowing for whether a hospital is in London, or to the way that population size is 
allowed for, raises the possibility that the results in previous studies may also not be robust.  We 
therefore propose to use in future work ĂƉĂŶĞůŽĨĚĂƚĂŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ
to investigate whether results are sensitive to these factors.   
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2. Review of theory literature 
The effect of competition on hospital behaviour has been the subject of an extensive theoretical 
literature and several recent literature reviews (Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor and Town, 2011). Here, we 
ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĂŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŚĞƌĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ƉƌŝĐĞƐĂƌĞfixed. 
This includes the Payment by Results (PbR) system in England which is based on Healthcare Resource 
Groups (HRGs). The payment system is similar to the DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups) system 
introduced by Medicare in the US in the early eighties, though US hospitals have a larger proportion 
of privately insured patients and a higher proportion of them are for-profit or private not-for-profit 
organisations rather than public hospitals. 
 
We therefore do not discuss the literature on hospital competition under variable prices, where each 
hospital can set prices constrained only by the demand function it faces or where prices are the 
result of a bargaining procedure between the purchaser of health services (a private or a public 
insurer) and the hospital (Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2012). 
 
It is often claimed that under a fixed-price regime, more competition leads to higher quality. The 
intuition underlying the claim is that with fixed prices hospitals can attract more patients only by 
raising their quality. With more competition amongst hospitals, demand will be more responsive to 
quality, thereby increasing the additional revenue from raising quality. Formal economic models 
show that this intuition is correct provided that more competition does increase the responsiveness 
of demand to quality, that providers are profit maximisers, that the marginal cost of additional 
patients is constant, and that providers always meet whatever demand is generated by their quality 
demand (Ma and Burgess, 1993; Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor and Vogt, 2003).  
 
The incentive to increase quality is stronger, the larger the profit margin, ie the difference between 
price and the marginal cost of additional patients.  Increasing the fixed price will increase the 
marginal net profit from higher quality and so will increase quality: the quality supply function is 
increasing in the fixed price. 
 
Since under the English PbR prospective payment system, the price is related to the average cost, 
the profit margin will be larger for procedures characterised by large fixed costs and low marginal 
costs. The profit margin will be positive for hospitals operating at volumes where their marginal cost 
is constant or decreasing. The profit margin will also be greater if the prospective price computation 
includes investment/capital costs (whether this is the case varies across countries).  In some 
countries, like Norway, the fixed price is a proportion of the average cost (around 40-60% of the 
average cost). In this case it is not obvious that the profit margin is positive. If the profit margin is 
negative, then the financial incentive to increase quality will be negative: providers will wish to 
reduce quality but will be constrained by sanctions from quality regulators and the threat of 
malpractice suits from patients.  Increases in competition in this case can reduce quality. 
 
2.1 Hospital objectives  
The extent to which providers respond to competition depends on who is taking decisions which 
affect quality, their preferences, and who is ƚŚĞ “ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ŝĞŚĂs control over any financial 
surplus.  Almost all hospitals providing care to NHS patients are public: they have no shareholders.  
However, they are subject to financial targets which require them to break even or earn a financial 
surplus to be reinvested in providing services.  Thus they will take the financial consequence of 
decisions about quality into account.   
 
Some decisions affecting quality in a hospital are made at hospital level: hospitals invest in better 
trained staff or in better record keeping.  Others are made by doctors and nurses who, in the NHS, 
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are typically paid a paid a fixed salary, as opposed to fee for service, or a share of profits.  We may 
expect the financial incentive to respond to increased competition by raising quality will be diluted if 
those who take decisions affecting quality do not receive any financial benefit from higher quality.   
 
In the health economics literature, it is recognised that doctors may not be entirely selfish (McGuire, 
2000) so that they do not act like income or profit maximisers (net of their effort costs) but are 
motivated by an ĂůƚƌƵŝƐƚŝĐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? health.  Alternatively, the ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĐĂŶďĞ
viewed as the result of bargaining between managers (who are more concerned with financial 
constraints and targets) and doctors who are more directly concerned with patient wellbeing. It is 
therefore common in the health economics literature to assume that providers act as if they were 
maximising a weighted sum of profits and benefits for the patients.  This assumption implies that 
providers may be willing to treat patients on whom they make a financial loss and for whom the 
marginal profit from an increase in quality is negative.  In these circumstances more competition 
may lead to lower quality.  
 
There is however another effect of altruism which works in the opposite direction. If providers are 
altruistic they also have a higher marginal benefit from increasing quality: attracting an additional 
patient increases total patient benefit which increases the utility of the provider through the 
altruistic component. This effect tends to reinforce the positive effect of competition on quality. 
Depending on the size of the two effects more competition may increase or reduce quality (Brekke, 
Siciliani and Straume, 2011). A similar type of reasoning applies when hospitals compete on waiting 
times as opposed to quality, where waiting times can be thought of a negative form of quality 
(Brekke, Siciliani and Straume, 2008).  
 
2.2 Specialisation  
As well as competing on quality hospitals may specialise by attracting particular types of patient.  By 
specialising, providers can reduce the competition they face in their specialist treatment.  The extent 
to which hospitals have an incentive to specialise depends on the convexity of the cost function with 
respect to quality (ie the degree to which a marginal increase in quality increases the marginal cost 
of quality). The less convex is the cost function, the more there is scope to relax quality competition. 
In some cases the incentive may be so strong that specialisation is maximal. The degree of 
specialisation also depends on price-cost margin. An increase in the price (and in the margin) gives 
stronger incentive to compete in quality, which in turn increases the incentive to further specialise 
to relax quality competition (Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume, 2006).  
 
Nuscheler (2003) also investigates quality and location (specialisation) in a spatial framework. 
Moreover, he assumes free entry. He shows that generally higher regulated prices discourage entry, 
which is surprising. The reason for this result is that a higher price encourages a quality increase 
which reduces profit margins and this effect may be stronger than the price increase.  
 
2.3 Information on quality  
The incentive to compete on quality may be enhanced by giving more accurate information about 
quality to patients, for example by publishing data on quality measures.  Such information reduces 
the cost of quality comparisons amongst hospitals for GPs or patients. It seems intuitive that this 
would increase the responsiveness of demand to quality and hence increase the marginal profit from 
increasing quality. However, Gravelle and Sivey (2010) show that this argument is correct only when 
hospitals ĚŽŶŽƚĚŝĨĨĞƌƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŝŶƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇƚŚĞǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ?/ĨƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?
marginal cost of providing quality is large, then their quality differences will tend to be large.  In such 
cases better information about quality may lead to lower quality.  Demand at a hospital depends on 
the difference in quality between that hospital and a competing hospital, and on the distribution of 
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the differences in the errors each patient makes when observing qualities at the two hospitals. 
Unless an indiǀŝĚƵĂů ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞƌƌŽƌƐ ŝŶ ŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĂƌĞ ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?
the distribution of the difference in errors for each patient is unimodal and centred on zero. For 
most patients the difference in their errors is small and few patients have large differences in errors. 
Thus the marginal revenue from improving quality is smaller, for both hospitals, when the true 
quality difference is large. Improving the accuracy of patient information makes it even less likely 
that they will have large differences in errors and thus reduces the marginal revenue from quality 
increases when the true quality difference is large. Thus if the initial quality difference is large better 
information will reduce marginal revenue from quality at both hospitals and thus reduce quality 
levels at both hospitals. 
 
In Gravelle and Masiero (2000) GPs are paid by capitation (a fee for each patient registered in the 
practice). GPs compete on quality but quality is only imperfectly observed. The study shows that for 
a given capitation fee, the presence of imperfect information reduces the effect of a higher 
capitation fee on quality. 
 
2.4 Dynamic analysis and cost structure  
All the above analyses have been derived within a static framework where providers play a one-shot 
game, and decisions on quality are made and are implemented in one period.  But some types of 
quality are akin to a stock which increases only if the investment in quality is higher than its 
depreciation rate. It has been shown that when providers are allowed to revise their investment 
decisions more frequently (which can be thought of as a more competitive environment compared 
to one where quality can be revised only after a long time gap), long-run quality may be lower if the 
marginal cost of treating a patient is increasing. This result arises because in a dynamic setting lower 
quality investment by one provider will induce a future reduction in quality investment by the other 
provider (quality levels are strategic complements over time (Brekke et al, 2010). 
 
2.5 Gatekeeping 
Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2007) investigate how hospital quality competition is affected by 
the introduction of compulsory gatekeeping where every patient needs to have a referral to access a 
hospital specialist. They find that gatekeeping may amplify or dampen competition depending on 
the relative size of two effects. On one hand competition is amplified by higher GP attendances, ie 
more patients get better recommendations on which provider to use. On the other hand it can be 
dampened by improved accuracy in diagnosis. 
 
2.6 Cream-skimming  
If providers can differentiate the level of quality among different patients with different severity 
levels, then they might have an incentive to cream-skim, ie to increase the quality for profitable 
patients (where the profit margin is pŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐŬŝŵƉ ? ? ŝĞ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ŶŽŶ-
profitable ones (where the profit margin is negative). These incentives may be strengthened in the 
presence of more intense competition (Ellis, 1998). 
 
2.7 Cost-containment effort  
In the absence of any cost reimbursement arrangement, any type of payment which does not vary 
£1 for £1 with costs (for example a fixed budget or a prospective payment system like PbR) will give 
the appropriate incentive to keep costs down. If the provider is the residual claimant who has 
control over any surplus, the incentives to exert effort to keep costs down are such that the benefits 
from lower cost reductions are equal to the marginal disutility from such effort. Any effect of 
competition on cost-containment effort arises through the interaction with quality.  
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If more competition increases quality and cost-containment effort and quality are substitutes, then 
more competition may lead to lower cost-containment effort. On the contrary if they are 
complements higher quality will induce an increase in cost-containment effort. One reason for such 
complementarity may arise if higher quality leads to higher volume of patients treated, which in turn 
may increase the marginal benefit from investing in cost-containment effort since the higher profit 
margin will apply to a larger volume of patients treated (these results can be obtained by adapting 
the analysis of Ma, 1994).  
 
Table 1 Theoretical papers on quality and competition under fixed prices 
Paper Competition measure Effect on quality Key assumptions 
Ma and Burgess (1993) Lower transportation 
costs 
Positive Profit maximiser provider, 
constant marginal cost 
Gaynor (2006) Number of providers Positive Higher n. of providers 
increases elasticity of 
demand wrt quality 
Brekke, Siciliani and 
Straume (2011) 
Lower transportation 
costs, number of hospitals 
Ambiguous Altruism, increasing 
marginal cost of treatment 
Brekke, Nuscheler and 
Straume (2006) 
Lower transportation 
costs 
Ambiguous Convexity of the cost 
function of quality 
Gravelle and Sivey (2010) Information accuracy Ambiguous Quality is observable with a 
noise  
Gravelle and Masiero 
(2000) 
Information accuracy Positive Switching costs 
Brekke et al (2010) Provider revises quality 
choice more frequently 
Negative Increasing marginal cost of 
treatment; dynamic analysis 
Ellis, 1998 Lower transportation 
costs 
Positive for low-cost 
patients. 
Negative for high-cost 
patients 
Profit maximiser provider, 
patients differ in costs 
 
2.8 Gaps in the literature 
The theoretical literature on hospital competition under fixed prices does not take account of a 
number of features of hospital markets which may affect predictions about competition and quality. 
 
2.8.1 Rationing by waiting 
Much of the literature relies on the implicit assumption that the only way hospitals can compete, 
given that the prices paid by patients are fixed (at zero), is via their quality and that they meet the 
demand generated by their choice of quality. But in the market for elective care demand depends on 
waiting time as well as quality (Beckert, Christensen and Collyer, 2012; Gaynor, Propper and Seiler, 
2010). Given the quality and supply chosen by a provider, the waiting time adjusts to ensure that 
demand equals supply.   
 
Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2008) consider the effect of competition in a model with a fixed 
number of providers facing a regulated price where providers compete via their waiting times but 
not via quality. Greater competition (lower transportation costs) reduces the equilibrium waiting 
time. But none of the literature has yet considered the effect of greater competition in markets 
where quality and waiting time affect demand.
1
    
 
                                                 
1
 Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) show that the incentive effect of the regulated price on quality is weakened when 
demand at the chosen quality is less than the capacity of the provider but they assume that demand depends only on 
quality and so cannot consider the role of waiting times.  
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2.8.2 Linked markets 
Since most types of hospital care require that the patient visit the hospital and greater distances 
impose greater access costs on patients, the market for a hospital is geographically defined: patients 
beyond a certain distance (or travel time) will not use the hospital.
2
  The set of competitors for a 
hospital A is the set of hospitals whose catchment area includes ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ŝŶ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů  ?Ɛ
catchment area.  In general, hospitals do not have the same sets of competitors: the fact that 
hospital A and B are competitors and that B and C are competitors does not imply that A and C are 
competitors.   Catchment areas may overlap but they are not identical.   The empirical literature 
generally takes account of this fact when constructing measures of competition facing a hospital but 
there are no formal theoretical models of hospital competition and quality which do so.
3
   
 
2.8.3 Market size 
Hospital markets (catchment areas) defined in terms of travel time or travel cost vary in both 
population size and density. But the theoretical literature on hospital competition is silent on the 
role of the size of the market as measured by the total population or density of potential patients.  
The population is assumed to be fixed and is often normalised to 1 in order to reduce notation.  This 
has the unfortunate consequence that the question of whether population in a market affects 
quality or the response of quality to competition is then not considered.   
 
The literature on standard markets with profit maximising firms with free entry and exit suggests 
that market size has important consequences for quality and specialisation.  Thus Shaked and Sutton 
(1987) have shown that as the number of consumers in a market increases both the maximal level of 
quality offered by firms and the extent of specialisation will increase.  
 
We have sketched in Appendix B a simple model of quality competition under fixed prices and show 
that as the population size and density vary so does the level of quality.  The reason is that if 
population density increases the number of patients gained by increasing quality is higher so that 
more densely populated areas will have higher quality.  Holding population density constant, a 
higher population means that any hospital will treat more patients and, if marginal costs of 
treatment and quality are increasing with the number of patients, this will reduce the marginal 
incentive to increase quality.  Population size and density also affect the extent to which an increase 
in competition (the number of firms) increases quality.  However, the model makes quite specific 
assumptions about the distribution of patients, the location of providers and the cost function so 
that it is not clear how general these result are or whether the methods in Shaked and Sutton (1987) 
,which make quite weak assumptions about the strategic interactions of firms, can be applied to 
healthcare markets with regulated prices.  
 
2.8.4 Determinants of market structure 
The literature on hospital competition under fixed prices typically assumes a one stage game in 
which hospitals simultaneously choose quality.  The number of hospitals is taken as exogenous and 
the effect of competition is modelled by investigating the effect on quality of an increase in the 
number of firms.   
 
In markets where providers are private and profit maximising rather than public and there is no 
control over entry a two stage game is more appropriate: firms first decide whether to enter or 
remain in a market and then decide on their actions given the number of firms who are in the 
market.  With no entry controls the number of firms is determined by a zero profit condition.   
                                                 
2
 ^ƚƌŝĐƚůǇƚŚŝƐĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĂĐĐĞƐƐĐŽƐƚƐďĞŝŶŐĨŝŶŝƚĞ ? 
3
 Beckert (2010) has set out a model of interlinked retail markets in which consumers care about distance, price and other 
characteristics of stores and used it to estimate demand functions. 
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In interpreting data on the relationship between competition and quality it matters how the number 
of firms (and thus the amount of competition) was determined.  If the process determining the 
number of firms leads to the number of firms being correlated with other factors affecting quality 
then cross section estimates of the effect of competition, based on the association of quality and 
competition across markets, are biased.  For example, in the simple model sketched in Appendix B, 
we find that population size in a market affects both the quality in the market and the number of 
firms.  This suggests that unless population size is included as a covariate in the regression of quality 
on the number of firms the estimated effect of the number of firms on quality will be biased.  
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3. Empirical literature: selective review  
In this section we briefly review two relevant literatures.  The first examines whether choice of 
hospital is affected by quality and the second tests directly for an effect of competition on quality in 
the English NHS.  
 
3.1 Literature on choice of hospital and quality 
One of the key steps in the argument that greater competition, with fixed prices, can lead to higher 
quality is that the choice of a hospital by patients (or their GP advisors) is influenced by its quality 
relative to that of other available hospitals.  Thus by improving quality, relative to other hospitals, a 
hospital can attract more patients and thereby increase its revenue.  The papers are summarised in 
Table 2.  We do not limit the papers to those for markets where price is regulated since we are 
interested in whether quality affects demand, holding other factors constant, rather than whether 
competition affects quality.   
 
Most of the studies suggest that, after controlling for other factors such as patient characteristics 
and distance, the probability of a hospital being chosen increases with measures of quality.   
 
Three of the 12 are studies set in the English NHS (Beckert et al, 2012; Gaynor et al, 2011; Sivey, 
2008) and are in line with the other, mainly US, studies.  The papers on the English NHS allow for 
waiting times, distance, and patient characteristics.  Beckert et al (2012) and Gaynor et (2011) find 
that higher quality leads to increased demand and Sivey (2008) finds demand increases with quality 
(mortality) in one of his specifications but not the other.   
 
Most of the papers model the choice of individuals amongst hospitals using either conditional logit 
or mixed logit.  Conditional logit models make the strong assumption that the probability of choosing 
hospital A rather than hospital B is not affected by the characteristics of other hospitals. Thus the 
relative probabilities of choosing A over B when the choice set includes hospital C which has the 
same characteristics as B are assumed to be the same as when the choice set does not include C.  
But it seems more plausible that patients who would have chosen C will switch to B in its absence so 
that the proportion choosing A will fall.  Mixed logit models do not impose this restriction and also 
allow for the possibility that the effects of hospital characteristics on choice vary with unobservable 
characteristics of patients.  The conditional logit model allows the effects of hospital characteristics 
on choice to vary only with observable characteristics of patients.   
 
One of the problems in estimating the effects of hospital quality on choice is that measured hospital 
quality may depend on the mix of patients at the hospital and the mix of patients may depend in 
part on quality. Thus, for instance, measured quality is lower if the hospital attracts sicker patients 
and sicker patients care more about true quality, then the effect of quality on demand will be 
underestimated.  Thus it is important to use measures of quality which allow for the effects of 
patient characteristics on quality.  The papers do this in three ways.  First, they may use a 
standardised quality measure for a hospital calculated as the ratio of actual quality to the quality 
which would be expected at the hospital given its patients mix.  Second, individual patient quality is 
regressed on patient characteristics and a hospital dummy and the estimated hospital effect is used 
as the measure of quality.  Both methods are improved by using richer data on individual patients to 
estimate hospital quality.  Third, as in Sivey (2008), demand is first estimated as a function of waiting 
time, distance and a hospital dummy variable capturing all unobserved hospital factors, and then the 
hospital effect regressed on hospital characteristics including quality.  It is argued (Murdoch, 2006) 
that this procedure prevents the under-estimation of standard errors which arises if quality 
measures are entered directly in the demand model.   
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A second problem arises in systems, like the NHS, where hospital waiting times adjust to equate 
demand and supply.  Higher treatment quality will lead to longer waiting times if the hospital does 
not increase the number of patients treated. Thus waiting times should be included in the demand 
model because they affect demand and may be correlated with quality.   Gaynor et al (2011) also 
allow for the possibility that waiting time for CABG is correlated with unobserved aspect of CABG 
quality by using waiting times for other procedures in the same hospital as an instrumental variable 
for CAGB waiting time.  Sivey (2008) estimates a model of waiting time for individual patients 
including patient characteristics and a hospital dummy and then calculates the waiting time for a 
hospital as the median of the estimated waiting times.  This procedure removes any bias arising from 
the individual patient quality and waiting times being correlated with unobserved patient 
characteristics.  Beckert et al (2011) use a hospital level average waiting time which assumes that 
there are no unobserved hospital level quality measures affecting demand which are also correlated 
with waiting times. 
 
3.2 Literature on NHS hospital competition and quality  
There are five studies on NHS hospital competition and quality. They are summarised in Table 3.  
Two studies (Propper et al, 2004; Propper et al, 2008) cover the internal markets period of the 
1990ies when prices were not fixed.  Three studies are for the later fixed PbR price regime.  Bevan 
and Skellern (2011) and OHE (2012) have also reviewed these studies and the three most recent 
ones have been subject of an exchange in The Lancet (Pollock et al, 2011a; 2011b; Bloom et al, 
2011b; 2012).  
 
These five papers focussed primarily on mortality rates for patients admitted with acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI). The use of AMI mortality for emergency admissions as a quality measure is justified 
by its correlation with other measures of quality expected to influence demand for elective care. The 
papers report that competition raises quality when prices are fixed but reduces it when prices are 
market determined by providers or by negotiation between providers and purchasers. 
 
An observed association between competition and hospital quality does not prove that competition 
affects quality. For example,  
 
(i) if higher quality hospitals disproportionately attract patients who are sicker and if the quality 
measure fails to allow appropriately for differences in casemix, and the competition measure is 
based on market shares, then we may observe a positive association between measured quality and 
measured competition; 
 
 ?ŝŝ ? ŝĨ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ? ŚĂƌĞƐ ŽĨ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĂƌĞĂ ĂŶĚ
patient choice of hospital is influenced by quality, then higher quality hospitals will have greater 
market shares and will appear to be in less competitive markets.   
 
(iii) when competition is measured in terms of the numbers of alternative providers, there may be 
factors (such as population density or size in the model we sketch in Appendix B) which influence 
both the entry/exit decisions of providers and the quality decisions of providers in the market.  
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Table 2   Quality and choice of hospital: empirical papers  
Paper Sample Quality measure Methods Covariates Results Comments 
Beckert et al 
(2012) 
England. 2008/9. 
39,060 elective hip 
replacement 
patients, 216 NHS 
hospitals 
Standardised overall 
mortality rate; MRSA;  
CQC; good 
communication 
Conditional logit. Similar 
results from mixed logit with 
random coefficients 
Age, gender, rurality, income, 
health deprivation. LSOA to site 
distance; teaching hospital, 
Foundation Trust, staff per bed, 
MRSA, CQC quality, CQC 
financial rating, waiting time; 
GP relative referral frequency 
to hospital 2006-8.  PCT effects. 
Demand decreases with 
mortality, waiting time, MRSA; 
increases with CQC rating; 
 
Burns & 
Wholey 
(1992) 
Phoenix. 1989. 4 
medical, 2 surgical 
DRGs.  
Standardised in- 
hospital mortality for 
each DRG 
Conditional logit. Distance. Supply of physicians 
near hospital.  
Demand lower if higher 
mortality for AMI, atrial 
fibrillation, gastro-intestinal 
bleeding, large bowel resection. 
 
Cutler et al 
(2004) 
New York. 1991-
1999. CABG 
patients 
Reports of 
standardised  
mortality  
Linear model with time, 
hospital FEs. 
 Fewer low severity CABG 
patients at hospital if previous 
high mortality report. 
 
Gaynor et al, 
2011. 
England. 29 
hospitals, 13,000 
elective CABG pa, 
2003/4-2007/8 
CABG hospital 
mortality rate 
Conditional logit; waiting 
time for other procedures as 
IV; distance as IV for quality. 
Age, gender, income 
deprivation, comorbidity; 
waiting times;  
Demand decreases with 
mortality (0.3 elasticity post 
2005); and waiting time (0.3 
elasticity post 2005). Sicker 
patients more sensitive to 
mortality, less to quality. 
 
Ho (2006) USA. 1997/8; 217 
hospitals, 11 
hospital markets, 
28,666 
indemnity/PPO 
patients 
Hospital 
characteristics 
(teaching status, set 
of services offered).  
Conditional logit; hospital 
fixed effects; regression of 
hospital FEs on hospital 
characteristic 
Age, gender, working status, 
Zip code median income, 
distance; diagnosis.  Hospital 
dummy characteristics in 
second stage.  
Patients prefer hospitals with 
better services for their 
diagnosis. 
No copayment 
data;  5% 
emergency patients 
Hodgkin 
(1996) 
27 hospitals. New 
Hampshire. 1985-
91. Diagnostic 
cardiac 
catheterisation.  
Availability of 
catheterisation.  
Standardised 
mortality. Staff per 
bed. 
Conditional logit. Hospital FE Age, gender, travel time, 
comorbidity, primary 
diagnoses.  Patient mortality 
risk, probability of needing 
catheterisation. Insurance type. 
Demand increased by 
catheterisation availability for 
patients most likely to need 
one.  Demand higher if hospital 
mortality higher. 
Number of 
hospitals offering 
procedure 
increased from 2 to 
9.  
Howard 
(2005) 
US. Kidney 
transplant patients 
2000-2002. 
Graft failure rate 
adjusted for patient 
characteristics.  
Mixed logit, random 
coefficients 
Age, gender, ethnicity, 
diabetes, education, 
employment, current 
treatment, insurance type. 
Demand increases with quality, 
decreases with distance. 
 
Luft et al 
(1990) 
California. 1983. 7 
surgical, 5 medical 
Standardised 
mortality; 
Conditional logit. Distance, charges, medical 
school, ownership. 
If mortality higher, demand 
smaller for 4/7 surgical, 2/5 
Demand reduced by 
higher mortality for 
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diagnoses.  99465 
patients. 115 
hospitals. 
complication  rates medical procedures; higher for 
1/7 surgical, 1/5 medical.  
CABG, AMI 
Pope (2009) USA. 1994-2004. 
Non emergency 
Medicare patients 
Reported quality 
rankings 
Hospital level demand with 
year, hospital- ,speciality FEs; 
individual level mixed logit 
(random coefficients). 
Distance.  Volume increases following 
improved ranking; probability 
of choice increases with 
ranking. 
 
Sivey (2008) England. 2001/2-
2003/4. 41019 
CABG patients. 33 
hospitals. 
Standardised 
mortality.   
One stage model: conditional 
& mixed logit with 
standardised mortality.  Two 
stage model: conditional & 
mixed logit with hospital FEs 
plus regression of FEs on 
hospital characteristics 
including quality. 
Patient characteristics, 
diagnoses. Waiting time. Travel 
time. London hospital. 
One stage model: demand 
lower if mortality higher. Two 
stage model: no significant 
effect of mortality. 
 
Tay (2003) AMI. Non HMO 
Medicare. 14,374 
patients. 339 
hospitals. California, 
Oregon, 
Washington. 1994 
10 year average 
mortality & 
complication rates; 
nurses per bed, 
teaching status, high 
tech services 
(catheterisation, 
revascularisation). 
Conditional logit; mixed logit 
with random coefficients. 
Quadratic in mortality, 
complication rates. 
Age, gender, ethnicity; beds, 
distance. 
Demand falls with distance and 
increases with quality.  But for 
complication rate demand is 
higher at low and high rates. 
50% patients arrive 
in ambulance. 46% 
patients admitted 
to hospital nearest 
to home.  
Varkevisser 
et al (2010) 
Netherlands.  2003. 
5389 non-
emergency first 
outpatient 
appointments for 
neurosurgery. 66 
hospitals 
Overall reputation; 
reputation for 
neurosurgery; 
university medical 
centre.  
Conditional logit. Gender, non-adult; self 
employed. travel time, waiting 
time below average.  
Demand increases with overall 
reputation, waiting time below 
average.  No effect of 
neurosurgery reputation. 
Average of 26 
hospitals within 60 
minutes. 
Varkevisser 
et al (2012) 
Netherlands. 2006. 
2670 non 
emergency 
Angioplasty (PCI).  
19 hospitals. Single 
health insurer. 
2005 heart failure 
readmission rate; 
pressure sores; 
overall reputation; 
cardiology reputation 
(newspaper ranking).  
Conditional logit; mixed logit 
random coefficients 
Age, gender, employment 
status, travel time. University 
medical centre.  
Demand increases with overall 
reputation, cardiology 
reputation, university medical 
centre; pressure sores; 
decreases with readmission 
rate.  1 point increase in overall 
reputation (0.4 SD) increases 
demand by 65%. 
Pressure ulcers 
negatively 
correlated with 
other quality 
measures. No 
waiting time 
control. 
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A number of strategies are available to increase the likelihood that an observed association is 
evidence of causality.   
 
(i) rich set of covariates. Including covariates which plausibly affect quality reduce the risk of omitted 
variable bias.  In the studies of competition and quality this suggests in particular the need to allow 
for patient characteristics affecting measured quality ie for thorough casemix adjustment.  The 
studies examined here correct for casemix adjustment by including age, gender etc as explanatory 
variables which is more flexible than first directly or indirectly standardising quality with respect to 
age, gender etc as in many of the demand studies in Table 2, for example Beckert et al (2011).  
 
(ii) predicted market shares. Some competition measures are based on patterns of use of providers, 
as in the Herfindahl-Hirschman ŝŶĚĞǆ  ?,,/ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƵŵ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ? ƐƋƵĂƌĞĚ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ
shares.  Markets with higher HHIs are interpreted as less competitive.  But observed patterns of use 
reflect the quality of providers since quality affects patient choice. Thus a provider with higher 
quality will have larger market share and higher HHI and the estimated effect of competition 
(smaller HHI) on quality will be under-estimated.  Kessler and McClellan (2000) therefore suggest 
that the HHI is calculated from estimates based on a demand model which includes distance as the 
key explanatory and which does not contain hospital quality or other hospital variables correlated 
with quality.  
 
(iii) instrumental variables for competition: variables which are correlated with competition but 
which are not correlated with unobservable factors affecting quality.  For example, Gaynor et al 
(2011) use the political marginality of an area as an instrument for the competing number of 
hospitals, arguing that decisions on closing or merging hospitals will be affected by political 
considerations which are independent of the quality a hospital.   
 
(iv) difference in differences:  compare changes in quality over time for providers which had different 
changes in competition.   The obvious way to implement this strategy is compare hospitals where 
rivals entered or left with those where the set of rivals was unchanged.  Because there has been 
little entry or exit by hospitals providing NHS care in the periods studied by papers adopting this 
strategy,  competition is argued to depend on market structure (numbers of rivals or market shares) 
and national competition policy.   Changes in national policy lead to different changes in effective 
competitive pressures for providers depending on their market structure.  The methodology of 
difference-in-difference relies on the assumption of common trends: AMI mortality rates should fall 
at the same rate in the treatment and the control group ie for providers with different number of 
competitors. If the trends instead differ, then the empirical evaluation of pro-competition policy 
interventions will be biased upwards if mortality rates fall more rapidly in more competitive areas.  It 
is possible, as in Cooper et al (2011), to allow differential trends in the high and low competition 
groups of hospital and to test if the change in policy affected the trend one group compared to the 
other.   
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Table 3   Quality and NHS hospital competition: empirical papers 
  Competition Quality  Method Covariates Results 
Paper Data Market structure measure Competition policy     
Propper 
et al 
(2004) 
202 Trusts; 
Pooled 
1995/6-
1997/8 
(i) number of Trusts within 30min 
drive time per head of population 
(ii) share of catchment population 
within 30 min drive of 20+ Trusts 
Provider competition 
encouraged. Some 
flexibility on prices 
especially for patients of 
fundholding practices.  
AMI mortality; 30 
day in hospital; 
Trust level. 3 year 
weighted average 
Trust level. Cross 
section. OLS 
AMI patient age/gender  
distribution; beds, total 
admissions, AMI 
admissions; teaching 
hospital; heart specialism; 
London; Region; mortality, 
morbidity, unemployment. 
Trusts in more competitive 
areas have higher mortality 
rates. Elasticities: (i) 0.19; 
(ii) 0.07 
Propper 
et al 
(2008) 
Panel 145 
Trusts; 
1991/2-
1999/2000 
Dummy variables based on (i) 
number of Trusts within 30min 
drive time (ii) number of Trusts 
within 30min drive time per head 
of population; (iii) 100% of 
catchment area within 30 min of at 
least 6 Trusts.  Measured for 1993. 
Competition encouraged 
1992/3 to 1996/7; 
restricted 1991/2 & 
1997/8 to 1999/2000. 
AMI mortality; 30 
day in hospital; 
Trust level. Shrunk 
to year national 
mean 
Trust level. Hospital 
FE. DID. Treatment 
group: Trusts with 
competitive 
market; Treatment: 
competition 
encouraged 
Total admissions; length of 
stay of AMI emergency 
patients; total income; 
regional budget. 
Trusts in competitive areas 
had smaller reduction in 
AMI mortality during 
periods when competition 
was permitted compared to 
those in non-competitive 
areas. 
Cooper 
et al 
(2011) 
433,325 
AMI 
patients; 
2002Q1 to 
2008Q4 
Negative log of HHI.  (i) GP market 
HHI: hospitals within radius of 95
th
 
percentile of distance travelled by 
practice patients; weighted average 
of HHIs for 5 elective procedures. 
(ii) HHIs calculated using estimated 
demands; (iii) standard deviation of 
distance to nearest four hospital 
used as IV for competition 
measure. 
Fixed prospective prices 
rolled out from 2005/6. 
Greater choice of 
provider from 2006Q2  
AMI 30 day  
mortality in 
hospital. 
Linear individual 
mortality 
probability.  DID 
linear trends 
between hospitals 
in more competitive 
areas before and 
after choice made 
easier.  
Age, gender, Charlson 
comorbidity index, income 
deprivation. Hospital FEs. 
GP FEs.   
Mortality declined faster in 
more competitive areas 
when choice was made 
easier. 
Gaynor 
et al 
(2011) 
130 Trusts 
in 2003/4; 
121 in 
2007/8. 
HHIs for 2003/4 for MSOAs using 
elective predicted patient flows. 
HHI for hospital is weighted 
average of MSOA HHIs.  
Fixed prospective prices 
rolled out from 2005/6. 
Greater choice of 
provider from January 
2006. 
(i) AMI deaths 
within 30 days (any 
location), ages 35-
74.  (ii) All cause 28 
day within hospital 
mortality 
Trust level, OLS DID 
with hospital FEs. 
Age/gender patient mix. Greater reduction in 
mortality (AMI, all cause) in 
areas with smaller 
predicted HHI. No 
difference in reduction 
using actual HHI. 
Bloom et 
al (2011) 
100 Acute 
Trusts. 
2006. 
(i) Number of competing hospitals 
within 30km.  Political marginality 
used as IV. (ii) Weighted average of 
HHIs of areas using predicted 
choices.  
 In hospital mortality 
from AMI and 
surgery.  MRSA 
rates. Health Care 
Commission ratings. 
2SLS using political 
marginality as IV for 
number of 
competing 
hospitals. 
Number of private hospitals.  
Age/gender mix. Total & 
AMI admissions.  Number of 
sites. Population density.  FT 
status. Interviewer FEs. 
London dummy. Teaching 
hospital dummy.  
Lower AMI mortality in 
hospitals with better 
management. Better 
management in hospitals 
facing more competition. 
AMI: acute myocardial infarction.  DID: difference in differences. FE: fixed effect.  FT: Foundation Trust hospital.  HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared shares of providers). IV: instrumental variable. 
MSOA: medium super output area (average population 7200).  MRSA: methicillan resistant staphylococcus areaus. OLS: ordinary least squares.  2SLS: two stage least squares.  
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Propper, Burgess and Green (2004) examine the effect of competition on death rates from AMI using 
a sample of 202 Trusts for a cross-section of three pooled financial years 1995/6-1997-8. The cross-
section design is vulnerable to potential confounding from omitted variables though the authors 
include covariates such as local morbidity and whether the Trust was a teaching hospital. The key 
quality measure is AMI in-hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission with a myocardial 
infarction for patients aged 50 and over. Competition is measured as the number of trusts in a 
catchment area of 30 minutes travel time. As part of sensitivity analysis the study also uses the 
number of trusts standardised by the population of the catchment area. They find that more 
competition increases death rates. The result arises within an institutional framework where prices 
are not fixed. They argue that mechanism through which the result arises is that competition 
reduces prices, which in turn drives down quality because the marginal profit on additional patients 
attracted by higher quality is lower.   
 
Propper, Burgess and Gossage (2008) extend the above analysis to cover the period 
1991/2 1999/2000.  They argue that competition was encouraged by the government in year 
1991/2 and during 1997/8-1999/2000. Using a difference-in-difference methodology they compare 
the differences between AMI rates between years when competition was encouraged and years 
ǁŚĞŶŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĨŽƌĂ “ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŐƌŽƵƉŽĨŚŽƐƉitals facing many rivals against the difference for a 
 “ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ǁŝƚŚŶŽŽƌĨĞǁƌŝǀĂůƐ ? ?dŚĞǇĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐŝŶ
the treatment group with more rivals reduced their AMI rates more than hospitals in the control 
group.  
 
Cooper et al. (2011) estimates the effect of competition on AMI mortality rates during a period 
(2002-2008) when they argue that prices were fixed.  The analysis uses data from 227 hospital sites 
as opposed to data aggregated at Trust level (therefore allowing for Trusts with multiple sites). A 
difference-in-difference methodology was adopted. They assume that the introduction of Patient 
Choice from 2005 onward led to an increase in competition and that this increase in competition 
was greater in more competitive areas with more providers.  Competition was measured using 
market shares based on predicted rather than actual demand. They find that the introduction of 
Patient Choice was associated with a bigger reduction in AMI mortality in more competitive areas. 
AMI mortality fell by 0.31 percentage points per year faster in areas where competition was more 
intense by one standard deviation of their market structure indicator. 
 
Gaynor, Moreno-Serra and Propper (2011) use a similar methodology, also arguing that the 
introduction of Patient Choice increased competition more for hospitals in markets with a more 
competitive structure and using predicted demand to calculate market shares. They use two years of 
data: 2003 and 2007. The sample includes 130 hospitals (trusts) in 2003 and 121 in 2007. They find 
that hospitals which had a 10% higher Herfindahl index (ie faced less competition) in 2003 had a 
smaller (by 2.9%) decrease in AMI mortality rates between 2003 and 2007. There is a similar 
association for overall mortality rates, though the effect is quantitatively smaller.  Hospitals facing 
less competition in 2003 also had an increase in overall length of stay between 2003 and 2007 
relative to providers facing more competition in 2003. 
 
Bloom et al. (2011a) investigate the effect of competition on management quality. Management 
quality is measured by an index which includes incentives management, monitoring, target-setting 
and lean operations. The data are obtained through interviews from 100 trusts (about 61% of all 
trusts) and a mix of 161 clinicians and managers working in cardiology and orthopaedics specialities. 
The data is a cross section for 2005-6. The key measure of competition is the number of hospitals 
within a 30 km radius (their preferred measure of competition; Herfindahl indices based on market 
shares are also used as part of sensitivity analysis). To address the potential endogeneity between 
quality and competition an instrument based on the degree of political competition (public hospitals 
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are less likely to be closed in marginal constituencies) is used. They find that increasing the number 
of rival providers by three increases the index of management quality by more than a standard 
deviation, which implies a 6% reduction in AMI mortality rates. 
 
The above studies focus on mortality rates (in particular AMI mortality rates and overall mortality 
rates).  AMI mortality is argued to be less susceptible to manipulation in response to changes in the 
PbR tariff which rewarded upcoding which would produce a spurious increase in quality with less 
serious patients classified as more serious but having better outcomes.   
 
The fact that AMI admissions are emergencies is also argued to be a merit because this removes 
potential problems arising if the market competition is calculated using data from elective patient 
choices which reflect quality. However, because competition is for elective patients, not 
emergencies, it must also be argued that Trust decisions which affect quality for elective patients 
must also change AMI quality in the same direction.  This requires that mortality rates, in particularly 
for AMI, are correlated with the quality measures which affect demand from elective patients: they 
should ĂĐƚĂƐĂ ‘ĐĂŶĂƌǇŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĞshaft ? ?
 
Some correlations of AMI mortality with other quality indicators are reported in Cooper et al (2011), 
for example AMI and overall mortality have a correlation of 0.33. This seems quite low and, since 
elective treatments have much lower mortality than AMI and other emergencies, it is unclear that 
the correlation supports the canary in the mineshaft argument. Some studies are quite sceptical of 
the use of mortality as a measure of quality.  For example, Pitches, Mohammed and Lilford (2007) 
undertook a systematic literature review of 36 studies of the relationship between risk adjusted 
mortality and quality of care found that, of the 51 cases examined, there was a positive association 
in 26/51, a negative association in 9/51 and no association in 16/51.  
 
In the next section we use data from Dr Foster to undertake a preliminary examination of the extent 
to which a range of clinical and patient reported quality measures are correlated.  
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4. Correlations amongst quality measures 
In this section we examine the correlations between different quality measures at hospital level 
using data by Dr Foster (released in November 2010). The sample includes 147 trusts and refers to 
financial year 2009- ? ? ? ? ?tĞƵƐĞĚĂƚĂŽŶŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇƌĂƚĞƐ ?ƌĞĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĚŽƌĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
experience. We use data on standardised mortality rates split in different categories: overall, from 
high risk conditions, from low risk conditions, deaths after surgery, in-hospital stroke mortality and 
deaths resulting from hip fracture.   
 
Table 4 has summary statistics for the 16 quality measures which are described in more detail in 
Appendix A.   Most variables have been normalised to 100. Mortality rates have been computed by 
dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number and multiplying the figure by 100. As 
an example consider overall mortality rates. The maximum value within the hospital sample is 118: 
this implies that that the hospital with highest mortality rates has 18% more than expected mortality 
rates. The standard deviation is 9%. Readmission rates have a similar scaling. 
 
Hip and knee revisions and manipulations have a different scaling. The descriptive statistics suggest 
that on average 1.1% of patients are in need of a hip revision and manipulation. The rate for knee 
revisions is 0.5%. Redo rates for prostate section is 4.4%. The proportion of patients with hip 
fracture who received an operation within 2 days is on average 67.4%. On average 86.2% of patients 
found the hospital clean, 70.2% thought that they were involved in decisions, and 88% thought that 
they had confidence and trust in the doctors treating them.  
 
Table 4.  Descriptive statistics: quality measures 
  mean sd min Max count 
Overall mortality rate 99.264 9.303 71.855 117.930 147 
Mortality from high risk conditions 99.645 9.946 73.018 121.109 147 
Mortality from low risk conditions 92.513 26.743 31.299 182.502 147 
Deaths after surgery 100.182 25.438 26.330 179.417 147 
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 99.565 23.160 43.544 167.870 147 
In-hospital stroke mortality 101.726 14.159 66.102 166.067 147 
Hip replacement readmissions 104.796 25.491 33.395 175.313 147 
Knee replacement readmissions 102.346 35.256 0.000 219.409 147 
Stroke readmission  101.442 20.336 56.279 158.079 147 
Hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year  1.070 0.602 0.000 3.509 147 
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year 0.506 0.667 0.000 7.143 147 
Redo rates for prostate resection 4.401 2.031 0.000 12.311 145 
Hip fracture - Operation given within 2 days 67.403 11.966 33.586 94.309 147 
Clean Hospital room/ward 86.2 2.715 79 93.7 147 
Involved in decisions 70.244 3.244 60 78 147 
Trust in doctors 88.31 2.202 81.5 93 147 
 
4.1 Mortality rates  
Table 5 (top-left quadrant) provides a correlation matrix between six different mortality indicators 
(overall, from high and low risk conditions, deaths after surgery, in-hospital stroke mortality, deaths 
resulting from hip fracture).  
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Overall mortality rates are highly correlated with high-risk condition ones (with a correlation of 0.8). 
This is probably due to high-risk conditions being a large determinant of overall mortality rates. They 
have otherwise a correlation in the range 0.29-0.35 with other mortality indicators.  
 
Mortality rates from high-risk conditions have correlations in the range 0.25-0.49 with mortality 
rates other than overall mortality. Mortality rates from low-risk conditions have a low correlation 
with any other measure (in the range 0.14-0.35). The correlation between death after surgery and 
any other measure is in the range 0.02-0.29.   
 
Deaths resulting from hip fracture have a correlation of 0.37 with mortality rates of high risk 
conditions (again due to some extent to the first being included in the second), of 0.33 with overall 
mortality and between 0.16-0.2 with any other mortality indicator.  
 
In-hospital stroke mortality rates have a correlation of 0.49 with mortality rates of high risk 
conditions (again due to some extent to the first being included in the second), of 0.32 with overall 
mortality rates and between 0.02-0.16 with any other mortality indicator. 
 
4.2 Readmissions, revisions and redo  
Table 5 (bottom-right quadrant) gives the correlations hip and knee readmissions, stoke 
readmissions , hip and knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year, redo rates for prostate 
resection, and hip fracture operation within 2 days.  Note that, the last indicator (hip fracture 
operations within 2 days) is a positive quality measure while the others are negative.  
 
Readmissions. Hip readmissions have a correlation of 0.32 with knee readmissions and of only 0.07 
with stroke readmissions. There is very low correlation with the other measures (in the range -0.05 
to 0.02). Note that, perhaps surprisingly, there is no correlation between hip readmissions and hip 
revisions (0.01), and between hip readmissions and the proportion of operations within 2 days 
following a hip fracture (0.02).  
 
Knee readmissions have, as already mentioned, a correlation of 0.32 with hip readmissions and only 
0.09 with stroke readmission. There is very low correlation with other measures (in the range -0.06 
to 0.11). As for hip, there is no correlation between knee readmissions and knee revisions (-0.06). 
Stroke readmissions have a low correlation with all other measure (0.01 to 0.09). 
 
Revisions and redos. Hip and knee revisions have a correlation of 0.38 but there is low correlation 
with any other measure (in the range -0.06 to 0.11). Redo rates for prostate resection have low 
correlation with any other measure (in the range -0.06 to 0.11). 
 
Operation within 2 days. The proportion of hip fracture patients with an operation within two days 
has a low correlation with all other measure (in the range -0.02 to 0.11).  
 
4.3 Readmissions and mortality rates 
Table 5 (top-right quadrant) also provides the correlation between the different readmission and 
mortality rates. This is generally low and varies between -0.18 (knee revisions and mortality from 
low risk conditions) and 0.16 (death from hip fracture and stroke readmissions). Note that there is 
no correlation between stroke readmission rates and stroke in-hospital mortality rates (0.04).   
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Table 5.  Correlations amongst mortality and readmission variables 
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Overall mortality rate 1.00 0.80 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.13 
Mortality from high 
risk conditions 
0.80 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.49 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.07 
Mortality from low risk 
conditions 
0.35 0.25 1.00 0.22 0.19 0.14 -0.07 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 -0.18 0.03 -0.04 
Deaths after surgery 0.29 0.25 0.22 1.00 0.20 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 
Deaths resulting from 
hip fracture 
0.33 0.37 0.19 0.20 1.00 0.16 -0.04 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 
In-hospital stroke 
mortality 
0.32 0.49 0.14 0.02 0.16 1.00 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.02 
Hip replacement 
readmissions 
0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 1.00 0.32 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05 
Knee replacement 
readmissions 
-0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 0.32 1.00 0.09 0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 
Stroke readmission  -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.09 1.00 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.08 
Hip revisions and 
manipulations within 1 
year  
0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.04 1.00 0.38 0.09 -0.06 
Knee revisions and 
manipulations within 1 
year 
-0.09 -0.16 -0.18 -0.11 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.38 1.00 0.02 0.01 
Hip fracture - 
Operation given within 
2 days 
-0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 1.00 0.11 
Redo rates for 
prostate resection 
-0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.16 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.11 1.00 
Note: absolute value of correlation of at least 0.21 required for significance at 1%. 
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4.4 WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?Ğxperience 
Table 6 ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? dŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ ŽŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŚĂǀĞ Ă
correlation which varies between 0.46 and 0.76 (bottom-right quadrant). There is a nearly zero or a 
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ the selected mortality (from high risk 
conditions and from hip fracture) rates and readmission (hip and stroke) rates. The correlation 
ranges between 0.02 and -0.24. A negative correlation, despite being low, is to be expected since 
higher mortality or reĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƌĂƚĞƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ŽŶĞƐ ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? Ă ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ǁŝƚŚ
ďĞƚƚĞƌŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇƌĂƚĞƐĂůƐŽŚĂǀĞŚŝŐŚĞƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? 
 
Table 6.  Correlations: satisfaction, mortality, and readmissions 
 Mortality 
from high 
risk 
conditions 
Deaths 
resulting 
from hip 
fracture 
Hip 
replacement 
readmissions 
Stroke 
readmission  
Clean 
Hospital 
room/ward 
Involved 
in 
decisions 
Trust in 
the 
doctors 
Mortality from 
high risk 
conditions 
1.00 0.37 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 
Deaths 
resulting from 
hip fracture 
0.37 1.00 -0.04 0.17 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
Hip 
replacement 
readmissions 
0.04 -0.04 1.00 0.07 -0.10 -0.18 -0.04 
Stroke 
readmission  
-0.03 0.17 0.07 1.00 -0.17 -0.24 -0.22 
Clean Hospital 
room/ward 
0.02 0.03 -0.10 -0.17 1.00 0.50 0.46 
Involved in 
decisions 
-0.14 -0.04 -0.18 -0.24 0.50 1.00 0.76 
Trust in the 
doctors 
-0.15 -0.06 -0.04 -0.22 0.46 0.76 1.00 
Note: absolute value of correlation of at least 0.21 required for significance at 1% 
 
4.5 Conclusions  
The correlation between different types of quality measures is generally low, especially for 
correlations between mortality for high risk conditions and measures of quality for hip and knee 
surgery which are elective procedures, and between mortality for high risk conditions and patient 
experience measures. 
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5. Association of quality and competition 
5.1 Competition measures 
We develop several competition measures based on the number of hospitals within a catchment 
area of 10, 15, 20, 30, 40 and 50 kilometres radius (line distance and car distance) and with a 
catchment area based on 30 minutes car drive. These are described in Table 7.  
 
The average number of providers within 15 km and 30 minutes car drive is respectively equal to 3.6 
and 3.7 providers (these two measures have a correlation of 0.92). About one third of all hospitals 
ĂƌĞ  ‘ŵŽŶŽƉŽůŝƐƚƐ ? ? ŝĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶǇ Žƚher provider within a 30 minutes car drive. Another 
third is characterised by two or three providers. 16% have four to six providers, 12% have seven to 
ten providers, and only 7% have more than eleven providers (up to a maximum of 15).  
 
The number of providers within 15 km is highly correlated with the number of providers within 10, 
20, 30, 40 and 50 km (the correlation varying between 0.73 and 0.96; see Table 8 for details).  
 
The average population within a catchment radius 15 km is on average 1.1 millions. There are about 
4 providers per million population within a 15 km radius, with a minimum of 0.9 and a maximum of 
15.5 (and a standard deviation of 2.4). The correlation between the number of providers within 15 
km and the number of providers within 15 km standardised by the catchment population is -0.16.  
 
About 16% of the hospitals (24 hospitals) are in London. 50% of the hospitals have Foundation Trust 
status, and 18% of the hospitals are teaching hospitals.  
 
Table 7.  Competition measures: descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max Count 
N. providers within 10  km 2.116 2.366 1 12 147 
N. providers within 15  km 3.558 4.359 1 19 147 
N. providers within 20  km 5.136 6.142 1 23 147 
N. providers within 30  km 8.102 8.238 1 27 147 
N. providers within 40  km 11.340 9.998 1 32 147 
N. providers within 50  km 15.422 11.797 1 38 147 
N. providers within car distance: 10km 1.626 1.589 1 9 147 
N. providers within car distance: 15km 2.469 2.980 1 15 147 
N. providers within car distance: 20km 3.585 4.501 1 19 147 
N. providers within car distance: 30km 5.782 6.834 1 24 147 
N. providers within car distance: 40km 7.986 8.241 1 28 147 
N. providers within car distance: 50km 10.422 9.536 1 32 147 
N. providers within 30min 3.687 3.430 1 15 147 
Population within 15km (in millions) 1.104 1.335 0.064 5.103 147 
N. providers / Population within 15km 4.002 2.358 0.909 15.567 147 
Trust is in London 0.177 0.383 0 1 147 
Foundation Trust 0.497 0.502 0 1 147 
Teaching Trust 0.163 0.371 0 1 147 
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Table 8.  Correlations amongst competition measures 
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N. providers within 10  km 1 0.93 0.88 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.90 -0.14 
N. providers within 15  km 0.93 1 0.96 0.88 0.80 0.73 0.92 -0.16 
N. providers within 20  km 0.88 0.96 1 0.95 0.89 0.82 0.91 -0.24 
N. providers within 30  km 0.77 0.88 0.95 1 0.97 0.91 0.85 -0.31 
N. providers within 40  km 0.69 0.80 0.89 0.97 1 0.97 0.80 -0.36 
N. providers within 50  km 0.63 0.73 0.82 0.91 0.97 1 0.76 -0.40 
N. providers within 30min 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.80 0.76 1 -0.26 
N. providers/Pop within 
15km 
-0.14 -0.16 -0.24 -0.31 -0.36 -0.40 -0.26 1 
Note: absolute value of correlation of at least 0.21 required for significance at 1% 
 
 
5.2 Competition measures and mortality 
Table 9 provides cross-sectional regression results on the association of competition (measured by 
the number of providers within 30 minutes drive time) with the different mortality measures. We 
begin with the simplest model and then add control variables. 
 
The upper section of Table 9 shows that there is a negative and statistically significant association 
between competition and overall mortality, mortality from high-risk conditions, and deaths after 
surgery, but there is not a statistically significant association for low-risk conditions, deaths from hip 
fracture (though the coefficient is negative) and in-hospital stroke mortality (the coefficient is 
positive). The association is such that, if it were causal, increasing the number of hospitals in the 
catchment area by one reduces the probability of overall mortality (or relative risk) by approximately 
1% (0.9%). The possible effect is similar when mortality rates for high-risk conditions are used as the 
dependent variable and larger when death after surgery is used (2% reduction).  
 
The middle part of Table 9 replicates the analysis but controls for whether the hospital has teaching 
status and Foundation Trust status. Adding such controls does not qualitatively alter the results. The 
coefficient on competition in the overall and high-risk mortality regressions is however reduced. 
Teaching hospitals have lower overall mortality rates and Foundation trusts have lower mortality 
following a hip fracture.  
 
The bottom part of Table 9 shows the association of competition and mortality rates when we allow 
for a London effect. London enters both as a dummy variable and as an interaction with the 
competition variable. Competition ceases to have a significant association either on overall mortality 
rates, high-risk conditions mortality rates and death after surgery. Hospitals in London have 
generally lower mortality rates (except for deaths resulting from hip fracture), though this is 
ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂƚ  ? ?A? ůĞǀĞůŽŶůǇĨŽƌ  ‘ĚĞĂƚŚƐĂĨƚĞƌƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐant for the other 
measures. Competition now has a negative statistically significant association (at 10% level) with 
mortality from low-risk conditions for hospitals not based in London and a positive statistically 
significant association (at 5% level) for hospitals based in London.  
 
Table 10 replicates the analysis provided in Table 9 but uses the number of providers within 15 km 
standardised by population as the competition measure. Competition is not significant when we do 
not control for a London effect. The association between competition and overall mortality rates,   
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Table 9.  Competition and Mortality rates 
 
Overall 
mortality rate 
Mortality from 
high risk 
conditions 
Mortality from 
low risk 
conditions 
Deaths after surgery 
Deaths resulting 
from hip fracture 
In-hospital stroke 
mortality 
N. Provider within 30min -0.907*** -0.849*** -0.840 -1.955*** -0.610 0.260 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.194) (0.001) (0.277) (0.448) 
Constant 102.6*** 102.8*** 95.61*** 107.4*** 101.8*** 100.8*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. Provider within 30min -0.661*** -0.709*** -0.954 -2.002*** -0.334 0.322 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.171) (0.002) (0.569) (0.384) 
Controls: 
      Teaching Trust -6.250*** -3.504 2.903 1.027 -7.510 -1.546 
 
(0.002) (0.114) (0.641) (0.858) (0.154) (0.640) 
Foundation Trust -0.735 0.376 0.482 -2.896 -9.177** 0.169 
 
(0.604) (0.811) (0.914) (0.480) (0.015) (0.943) 
Constant 103.2*** 102.7*** 95.28*** 108.8*** 106.7*** 100.7*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. Provider within 30min 0.0816 0.0901 -2.438* -0.121 1.345 0.259 
 
(0.841) (0.843) (0.060) (0.918) (0.218) (0.708) 
Trust is in London -5.583 -3.217 -28.25 -26.21 3.752 -10.03 
 
(0.313) (0.603) (0.107) (0.101) (0.799) (0.285) 
London x N. Provider 
within 30min  
-0.292 -0.565 4.125** 0.345 -2.133 0.970 
 
(0.654) (0.438) (0.047) (0.854) (0.222) (0.381) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 102.5*** 101.8*** 99.76*** 108.1*** 103.9*** 101.6*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 10.  Competition (N. providers/population within 15km) and mortality rates 
 
Overall 
mortality 
rate 
Mortality from high 
risk conditions 
Mortality from low 
risk conditions 
Deaths after 
surgery 
Deaths resulting 
from hip fracture 
In-hospital stroke 
mortality 
N prov / Population by 15km 0.388 0.442 1.148 0.518 0.484 -0.403 
 
(0.237) (0.207) (0.223) (0.563) (0.554) (0.420) 
Constant 97.71*** 97.88*** 87.92*** 98.11*** 97.63*** 103.3*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N prov / Population by 15km 0.148 0.299 1.196 0.339 0.0977 -0.431 
 
(0.639) (0.394) (0.215) (0.711) (0.904) (0.400) 
Controls: 
      
Teaching Trust -8.205*** -5.456** 1.109 -5.014 -8.475* -0.970 
 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.851) (0.373) (0.091) (0.757) 
Foundation Trust -0.549 0.622 1.073 -2.369 -9.076** -0.0391 
 
(0.707) (0.701) (0.810) (0.577) (0.017) (0.987) 
Constant 100.4*** 99.11*** 87.00*** 100.9*** 105.2*** 103.6*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N prov / Population by 15km 0.0578 0.212 1.154 -0.210 0.0584 -0.301 
 
(0.847) (0.530) (0.243) (0.813) (0.944) (0.563) 
Trust is in London 27.18** 28.07** 23.23 1.488 37.36 36.37* 
 
(0.021) (0.034) (0.547) (0.966) (0.247) (0.075) 
London x N prov / Population by 
15km 
-11.40*** -11.68*** -9.243 -8.342 -14.46 -11.70* 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.455) (0.454) (0.163) (0.074) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 102.2*** 100.9*** 88.09*** 108.5*** 106.5*** 102.6*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 11.  Competition (N providers within 15km) and mortality rates, allowing for population 
 
Overall 
mortality 
rate 
Mortality from high 
risk conditions 
Mortality from low 
risk conditions 
Deaths after 
surgery 
Deaths resulting 
from hip fracture 
In-hospital stroke 
mortality 
N. providers within 15  km -0.370 -0.368 2.034 -2.237 0.600 -2.493* 
 
(0.633) (0.672) (0.412) (0.322) (0.774) (0.057) 
Controls: 
      
Teaching Trust -5.611*** -2.985 2.449 2.394 -7.144 -1.057 
 
(0.005) (0.176) (0.696) (0.675) (0.178) (0.748) 
Foundation Trust -1.458 -0.349 -0.642 -4.654 -9.726** 0.820 
 
(0.305) (0.826) (0.887) (0.260) (0.012) (0.730) 
Population within 15km 
(millions) 
-0.978 -1.012 -8.890 1.226 -3.159 8.767** 
 
(0.699) (0.721) (0.272) (0.868) (0.643) (0.040) 
Constant 103.4*** 102.8*** 94.97*** 108.7*** 107.0*** 100.7*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. providers within 15  km 0.691 0.993 1.040 -3.183 3.100 -2.408 
 
(0.446) (0.326) (0.725) (0.232) (0.207) (0.121) 
Population within 15km 
(millions) 
-0.290 -0.487 -10.47 10.90 -0.663 11.98** 
 
(0.920) (0.880) (0.270) (0.201) (0.933) (0.017) 
Trust is in London 4.672 6.974 -1.805 -32.40* 8.610 -8.308 
 
(0.446) (0.308) (0.928) (0.073) (0.603) (0.428) 
London x N providers within 
15km 
 
-1.550** -1.958*** 1.534 0.483 -3.730** -0.399 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.464) (0.797) (0.033) (0.715) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 101.3*** 100.2*** 97.17*** 107.6*** 101.9*** 99.64*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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mortality from high-risk conditions and deaths after surgery is not statistically significant. The 
analysis suggests that hospitals in London have higher (overall, high-risk and stroke) mortality and 
that conditional on being in London higher competition reduces mortality for the same indicators. 
 
Table 11 replicates the analysis provided in Table 10 but population and number of providers enter 
as separate variables in the regression. As in Table 10 competition as measured by the number of 
providers has no association with mortality rates. Population also has no association, with the 
exception of stroke mortality where higher population is positively associated with mortality rates. 
When London is included as a control and interacted with the measure of competition, we again find 
that the number of providers has no association with mortality for hospitals not in London. 
Conditional on being in London, a higher number of providers is negatively associated with overall 
and high-risk mortality rates, and deaths following a hip fracture. 
 
5.3 Competition measures and readmission, redo rates  
The upper part of Table 12 replicates the analysis when other quality measures are used as the 
dependent variable. There is a positive and statistically significant association between competition 
and stroke readmission rates, and competition and knee revisions. Increasing the number of 
providers by one increases stroke readmissions by 1.8% and knee revisions by 0.04% (given a sample 
mean of 0.5, this implies an increase in knee revisions by 8%). The coefficient is positive but not 
significant for hip and knee readmission rates, for hip revisions, redo rates for prostate resection and 
hip fracture operation within 2 days.  
 
When controls for teaching and foundation status are added into the analysis (middle part of Table 
12), the results remain qualitatively similar, with the exception of knee replacement readmissions: 
the coefficient is now positive and significant. Increasing the number of providers by one increases 
knee replacement readmissions by 1.5%. Teaching hospitals have lower readmissions rates for knee 
and stroke readmissions. The coefficient is large, respectively 20% and 11% lower readmissions. 
 
In the bottom part of Table 12 we allow for a London effect. For hospitals not located in London, 
competition increases stroke readmission rates but this is not the case for hospitals located in 
London. For hospitals not in London, the association of competition with knee revisions ceases to be 
significant. This is due to hospitals in London having higher knee revisions rates. Conditional on being 
in London, more competition reduces knee revisions rates, though the coefficient is significant only 
at 10% level.  
 
For hospitals not located in London, competition increases hip replacement readmission rates. For 
hospitals located in London the opposite holds: competition reduces hip replacement readmission 
rates. Moreover, hospitals in London have higher hip replacement readmission rates. When we look 
at redo rates for prostate resection a rather different picture emerges. For hospitals not located in 
London, competition reduces redo rates. For hospitals located in London, competition increases 
redo rates.   
 
Table 13 replicates the analysis but uses as competition measure the number of providers within 15 
km standardised by population. We see that now there is a negative statistically-significant 
association between competition and (hip, stroke) readmission and knee revision rates, and positive 
for the proportion of hip fracture within two days. This is in contrast with the results obtained in 
Table 12. Once we control for the hospital being located in London, we only find some significant 
associations between competition and the quality indicators for the sample of hospitals that are not 
located in London (for three out of four indicators, competition increases quality). 
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Table 12.  Competition and Readmissions/Revisions 
 
Hip 
replacement 
readmissions 
Knee replacement 
readmissions 
Stroke readmission  
Hip revisions and 
manipulations 
within 1 year 
Knee revisions and 
manipulations 
within 1 year 
Hip fracture - 
Operation given 
within 2 days 
Redo rates for 
prostate resection 
N. Provider within 30min 0.567 0.757 1.783*** 0.0202 0.0401** 0.276 0.0645 
 
(0.358) (0.375) (0.000) (0.166) (0.012) (0.340) (0.191) 
Constant 102.7*** 99.55*** 94.87*** 0.996*** 0.358*** 66.38*** 4.163*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. Provider within 30min 0.769 1.544* 2.200*** 0.0250 0.0481*** 0.405 0.0575 
 
(0.246) (0.088) (0.000) (0.110) (0.005) (0.190) (0.279) 
Controls: 
      
 
Teaching Trust -4.851 -19.73** -10.75** -0.125 -0.205 -3.030 0.174 
 
(0.414) (0.016) (0.016) (0.371) (0.179) (0.273) (0.713) 
Foundation Trust 3.799 1.669 -3.851 -0.0424 -0.0688 3.362* 0.00289 
 
(0.370) (0.772) (0.224) (0.671) (0.526) (0.089) (0.993) 
Constant 100.9*** 99.31*** 97.14*** 1.021*** 0.399*** 64.78*** 4.157*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. Provider within 30min 3.108** 0.623 2.199** 0.0221 0.0195 -0.470 -0.252*** 
 
(0.011) (0.713) (0.019) (0.450) (0.524) (0.410) (0.010) 
Trust is in London 37.08** -5.503 -1.690 0.377 1.226*** -9.880 -2.048 
 
(0.024) (0.810) (0.893) (0.342) (0.004) (0.202) (0.110) 
London x N. Provider within 
30min  
-5.833*** 1.479 0.153 -0.0307 -0.0797 1.823** 0.510*** 
 
(0.003) (0.584) (0.918) (0.510) (0.106) (0.047) (0.001) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 94.47*** 101.1*** 97.28*** 0.995*** 0.342*** 66.87*** 4.785*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 145 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 13.  Competition (N. providers/population within 15km) and readmissions/revisions 
 
Hip 
replacement 
readmissions 
Knee replacement 
readmissions 
Stroke readmission  
Hip revisions and 
manipulations 
within 1 year 
Knee revisions and 
manipulations 
within 1 year 
Hip fracture - 
Operation given 
within 2 days 
Redo rates for 
prostate resection 
N prov / Population by 15km -1.814** -0.731 -2.660*** -0.0303 -0.0387* 0.805* 0.102 
 
(0.042) (0.557) (0.000) (0.152) (0.099) (0.055) (0.155) 
Constant 112.1*** 105.3*** 112.1*** 1.192*** 0.660*** 64.18*** 3.994*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N prov / Population by 15km -1.888** -1.165 -2.937*** -0.0336 -0.0429* 0.838** 0.116 
 
(0.038) (0.354) (0.000) (0.121) (0.073) (0.049) (0.113) 
Controls: 
      
 
Teaching Trust -4.375 -16.02** -6.797 -0.0804 -0.0960 -0.858 0.481 
 
(0.432) (0.039) (0.109) (0.544) (0.512) (0.741) (0.283) 
Foundation Trust 3.019 0.965 -5.274* -0.0586 -0.0929 3.554* 0.0258 
 
(0.472) (0.868) (0.099) (0.558) (0.400) (0.071) (0.939) 
Constant 111.6*** 109.4*** 117.0*** 1.248*** 0.740*** 62.43*** 3.839*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N prov / Population by 15km -1.700* -1.063 -2.694*** -0.0277 -0.0249 0.972** 0.135* 
 
(0.069) (0.406) (0.000) (0.211) (0.287) (0.025) (0.066) 
Trust is in London 45.66 -51.61 -10.92 0.324 1.437 4.746 -2.380 
 
(0.208) (0.301) (0.684) (0.706) (0.115) (0.777) (0.403) 
London x N prov / Population by 
15km 
-14.32 20.65 7.507 -0.0375 -0.279 0.129 1.157 
(0.219) (0.198) (0.384) (0.892) (0.339) (0.981) (0.206) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 110.0*** 106.8*** 113.4*** 1.174*** 0.523*** 60.69*** 3.522*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 145 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 14.  Competition (N providers within 15km) and readmissions/revisions, allowing for population 
 
Hip 
replacement 
readmissions 
Knee replacement 
readmissions 
Stroke readmission  
Hip revisions and 
manipulations 
within 1 year 
Knee revisions and 
manipulations 
within 1 year 
Hip fracture - 
Operation given 
within 2 days 
Redo rates for 
prostate resection 
N. providers within 15  km -3.666 -0.603 -2.256 -0.00389 -0.145** 2.111* 0.0237 
 
(0.120) (0.851) (0.200) (0.944) (0.013) (0.053) (0.899) 
Controls: 
      
 
Teaching Trust -3.344 -19.54** -10.33** -0.124 -0.235 -3.377 0.0208 
 
(0.574) (0.017) (0.021) (0.381) (0.108) (0.220) (0.965) 
Foundation Trust 4.748 3.099 -1.567 -0.0199 0.0153 3.387* 0.101 
 
(0.270) (0.598) (0.625) (0.845) (0.885) (0.089) (0.770) 
Population within 15km 
(millions) 
13.02* 5.841 12.87** 0.0762 0.633*** -5.735 0.193 
 
(0.091) (0.578) (0.026) (0.675) (0.001) (0.107) (0.752) 
Constant 101.7*** 99.96*** 97.87*** 1.032*** 0.356*** 65.14*** 4.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. providers within 15  km 1.181 -2.738 -2.327 0.0134 -0.128* 1.551 -0.296 
 
(0.662) (0.476) (0.265) (0.841) (0.065) (0.231) (0.173) 
Population within 15km 
(millions) 
10.33 7.176 17.95*** -0.00225 0.539** -7.205* 0.193 
 
(0.233) (0.560) (0.008) (0.992) (0.016) (0.083) (0.782) 
Trust is in London 37.34** -16.86 -14.39 0.322 0.361 0.576 -2.014 
 
(0.042) (0.516) (0.308) (0.474) (0.439) (0.947) (0.170) 
London x N prov 15km -6.574*** 2.882 -0.345 -0.0174 -0.0156 0.914 0.451*** 
 
(0.001) (0.289) (0.815) (0.711) (0.748) (0.318) (0.004) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 93.93*** 103.3*** 96.56*** 1.024*** 0.353*** 66.54*** 4.615*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 145 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 14 replicates the analysis provided in Table 13 but allows population and number of providers 
to enter independently in the regression equation. It is still the case that the number of providers is 
negatively associated with knee revisions and positively with the proportion of hip fracture 
operations within two days. The association with hip replacement and stroke readmissions is not 
significant anymore. However, for these two variables (as well as knee revisions) population is 
positively associated with readmission rates. Once we control for hospitals being located in London, 
the number of providers is still negatively associated with stroke readmissions if hospitals are not 
located in London and with hip replacement readmissions for hospitals located in London. However, 
the number of providers is positively associated with redo rates for prostate resections for hospitals 
located in London. Finally, hospitals in London have higher hip-replacement readmission rates.  
 
5.4 Competition measures and patient experience  
Table 15  ?ƵƉƉĞƌƉĂƌƚ ?ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŽƌƐĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐ
of cleanliness and decision involvement but not for trust in nurses. The coefficients appear to be 
small. Adding one provider reduces the proportion of satisfied patients by less than 0.2%. When 
control variables are added to the regression (mid part of the table), we see that teaching hospitals 
and Foundation TƌƵƐƚ ĂƌĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŝŶthe three dimensions of 
patient experience. The association with competition becomes larger and more statistically 
significant for all three dimeŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ. 
 
Table 15.  Competition and patient experience 
 
Clean Hospital room/ward Involved in decisions Trust in the doctors 
N. Provider within 30min -0.194*** -0.171** -0.0153 
 
(0.003) (0.028) (0.775) 
Constant 86.92*** 70.88*** 88.37*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. Provider within 30min -0.250*** -0.272*** -0.0925* 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.077) 
Controls: 
   
Teaching Trust 1.482** 2.617*** 2.016*** 
 
(0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foundation Trust 1.464*** 1.347*** 1.119*** 
 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
Constant 86.13*** 70.12*** 87.74*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. Provider within 30min -0.103 -0.384*** -0.0735 
 
(0.380) (0.006) (0.438) 
 Trust is in London -4.093** -6.918*** -4.038*** 
 
(0.011) (0.000) (0.002) 
London x N. Provider   
within 30min  
0.211 0.741*** 0.343** 
(0.260) (0.001) (0.025) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 86.24*** 70.84*** 88.03*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Once we allow for a London effect a different picture emerges. Hospitals in London are characterised 
ďǇǁŽƌƐĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝƐůĂƌŐĞ PƉĂƚŝĞŶ Ɛ ?ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐůŽǁĞƌďǇ ?-7%. Conditional 
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on hospitals not being located in London, it is still the case that competition reduces satisfaction 
ǁŝƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŶŽstatistically significant effect on the other two dimensions. 
Interestingly, conditional on being located in London more competition increases both satisfaction 
with ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚƌƵƐƚŝŶŶƵƌƐĞƐ ? 
 
Table 16 replicates the analysis but uses as a competition measure the number of providers within 
15 km standardised by population. We see that now there is a positive statistically-significant 
association betweĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ  ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŽ
the results provided in Table 15). Once we control for the hospital being located in London, this 
result is confirmed for the hospitals that are not located in London. We do not find a statistically 
significant association between competition and any other patient satisfaction measure, and nor do 
ǁĞĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? 
 
Table 16.  Competition (N. providers / population within 15km) and patient experience 
 
Clean Hospital room/ward Involved in decisions Trust in the doctors 
N prov / Population by 
15km 
0.0675 0.401*** 0.0443 
 
(0.481) (0.000) (0.569) 
Constant 85.93*** 68.64*** 88.13*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N prov / Population by 
15km 
0.115 0.490*** 0.115 
 
(0.216) (0.000) (0.112) 
Controls: 
   
Teaching Trust 0.806 2.262*** 1.841*** 
 
(0.160) (0.001) (0.000) 
Foundation Trust 1.554*** 1.564*** 1.176*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 84.82*** 67.11*** 86.94*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N prov / Population by 
15km 
0.0538 0.440*** 0.0833 
 
(0.545) (0.000) (0.253) 
 Trust is in London 0.564 -0.589 -1.143 
 
(0.871) (0.884) (0.687) 
London x N prov / 
Population by 15km 
-1.086 -0.495 -0.0267 
(0.330) (0.702) (0.977) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 85.69*** 67.79*** 87.35*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Table 17 allows for population to enter independently from the number of providers. Similarly to 
Table 16 ?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵent and trust in doctors. When we 
control for hospitals being located in London, it is still the case that for hospitals not located in 
>ŽŶĚŽŶƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
is negatively associated with it.  
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Table 17.  Competition (N providers within 15km) and patient experience, allowing for population 
 
Clean Hospital 
room/ward 
Involved in decisions Trust in the doctors 
N. providers within 15  km 0.0594 0.762*** 0.232 
 
(0.793) (0.005) (0.206) 
Controls: 
   
Teaching Trust 1.590*** 2.567*** 2.075*** 
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foundation Trust 1.194*** 0.961* 0.967*** 
 
(0.004) (0.050) (0.004) 
Population (millions) within 
15km 
-0.927 -3.207*** -1.063* 
 
(0.211) (0.000) (0.077) 
Constant 86.14*** 70.14*** 87.81*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N. providers within 15  km -0.132 0.541* 0.149 
 
(0.621) (0.090) (0.495) 
Population within 15km 
(millions) 
0.0163 -2.954*** -0.560 
 
(0.985) (0.004) (0.424) 
Dummy=1 if Trust is in London -3.772** -2.067 -1.896 
 
(0.038) (0.336) (0.200) 
London x N prov 15km 
 
0.186 0.289 0.0730 
(0.324) (0.199) (0.636) 
Controls: Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 86.21*** 70.46*** 87.81*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 147 147 147 
t statistics in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
5.5 Preliminary conclusions 
Our main empirical findings suggest that a range of quality indicators tend to be poorly correlated 
within a hospital. The analysis therefore cautions against extrapolating the findings for a specific 
quality indicator to others. Moreover, we find that the association between competition and quality 
varies across quality measures, with the covariates included, and whether hospital is in London. 
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6. Future research  
6.1 Theoretical analysis  
Empirical work requires a solid theoretical framework to produce hypotheses, to guide the 
specification of equations to be estimated, to aid in interpreting results, and to warn when and how 
empirical results may be misleading. Our survey of the literature identified a number of gaps (the 
linking of provider markets, waiting times, population size in markets, and the determinants of the 
number of providers). We plan to extend existing models of hospital competition under fixed prices 
to incorporate these features to inform our empirical analysis.  
 
6.2 Empirical analysis 
Our survey of the relevant empirical literature and our preliminary empirical investigations suggest 
that the question of the existence and size of the effect of competition on hospital quality in the NHS 
is not yet settled. Future research should further explore the effect of competition on quality in a 
number of directions.  
 
We plan to use Hospital Episode Statistics data to construct AMI mortality rates (not part of the Dr 
Foster quality indicator set we used in this preliminary analysis) and additional quality measures 
(such as measures of preventable mortality, patient reported outcomes, and some measures 
included in the NHS Performance Framework).  Some of the measures will be specific to elective 
care.  We will examine the correlations amongst these measures to further test how well AMI 
mortality is correlated with other measures of quality, the extent to which specific quality measures 
vary over time within hospitals, and the extent to which correlations amongst quality measures are 
persistent over time.  
 
Simple cross section associations do not establish causality and the empirical literature discussed in 
section 3 has generally been careful to use other statistical methods (difference in difference 
analysis with panel data and instrumental variables) which are more likely to be tests for causality. 
However, the sensitivity of our simple cross-section associations to the choice of quality measure, to 
allowing for whether a hospital is in London,
4
  or to the way that population size is allowed for, raises 
the possibility that the results in previous studies may also not be robust.  We will therefore use a 
ƉĂŶĞůŽĨĚĂƚĂŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƌĞƐƵůƚƐƵƐŝŶŐŵŽƌĞ
sophisticated statistical tests are also sensitive to these and other factors. We will also investigate 
the robustness of results to alternative definitions of competitive market structures. Given the 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐon 
quality we will investigate the use of methods which allow for spatial clustering of providers and 
patients (Barrios et al, 2010; Mobley, 2003; Mobley, Frech and Anselin, 2009). 
 
 
  
                                                 
4
 Propper, Burgess and Green (2004) and Bloom et al (2011) include London dummies in their models as 
intercept shifters but do not interact them with competition to test whether the effects of competition differ 
in London.  
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Appendix A     Quality measures  
The quality measures are from the Dr Foster websites www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/quality-reports/,  
www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/patient-experience/.  
 
Mortality rates  
The mortality data, like those for the other non-patient experience measures, are derived from 
Hospital Episode Statistics for April 2009 to March 2010. The mortality data reported by Dr Foster 
are risk adjusted. A logistic regression is used to estimate the expected in-hospital mortality. Each 
measure is adjusted for differences in case-mix: sex, age on admission, admission method, socio-
economic deprivation, primary diagnosis, co-morbidities, number of previous emergency 
admissions, financial year of discharge, palliative care, month of admission, ethnicity and source of 
admission.  
 
The overall standardised mortality rates account for all in-hospital deaths, i.e. all spells whose 
method of discharge was death. Stroke and hip fracture mortality rates is restricted to in-hospital 
ŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ ǁŚŽƐĞ ƐƉĞůůƐ ? ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐ ǁĂƐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ĂĐƵƚĞ ĐĞƌĞďƌŽǀĂƐĐƵůĂƌ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ  ?/ ? ? P
G46, I60-I64, I66) or fracture neck of femur (ICD10: S720-S722). Standardised deaths after surgery 
refer to surgical patients who had a secondary diagnosis such as internal bleeding, pneumonia or a 
blood clot and subsequently died. 
 
High risk conditions include mortality from spells whose primary diagnosis is one of the these five 
groups: Acute myocardial infarction (ICD10: I21, I22), Acute cerebrovascular disease (ICD10: G46, 
I60-I64, I66), Pneumonia (ICD10: A202, A212, A310, A420, A430, A481, A78, B012, B052, B250, B583, 
B59, B671, J12-J16, J170-J173, J178, J18, J850, J851), Congestive heart failure - nonhypertensive 
(ICD10: I50) and Fracture of neck of femur - hip (ICD10: S720-S722). Low risk conditions include all 
in-hospital mortalities from all conditions with a death rate lower than 0.5%. This includes more than 
100 diagnosis groups. 
 
Readmission rates  
Dr Foster also provides data on hospital readmissions within 28 days from discharge for patients 
admitted for stroke, knee and hip replacement. Stroke, knee and hip replacement standardised 
readmission ratios are the ratio  of observed number of spells with emergency readmissions within 
28 days of discharge with a knee replacement procedure (procedure/OPCS code O18, W40-
W42,W5[234][1389](+Z844-6), W580-2(+Z846)), a hip replacement procedure (W37-W39, W93-
W95) or a acute cerebrovascular disease diagnostic (ICD10: G46, I60-I64, I66), respectively, to the 
expected number of readmissions for each procedure estimated using a logistic regression that 
adjusts for factors to indirectly standardise for differences in case-mix (which is the same used for in-
hospital mortality standardised ratios). The readmission rate attributed to a given hospital includes 
all patients who were treated in that hospital and readmitted within 28 days in that same hospital or 
any other hospital. 
 
Revisions  
We also use knee revisions and manipulations within a year and similarly data for patients in need of 
hip replacement. The knee or hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year are the proportion of 
joint replacements with a revision procedure within 365 days of the initial (index) procedure, over 
the total number of joint replacements carried out at the trust over a three year period. The 
measure refers to a three year period since revisions occur infrequently and therefore sample size 
may be small in a given year.  
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Redo rates  
Redo rates for prostate resection are the rates of endoscopy resection of outlet of male bladder 
procedure (OPCS code: M65) spells where a second operation was performed within three years 
(April 2004 and March 2007). More precisely, all spells where another TURP (Transurethral resection 
of the prostate) procedure was performed within 3 years of the last TURP procedure are included in 
the numerator. The denominator includes all TURP procedures discharged between April 2004 and 
March 2007.  
 
Hip fracture operations within two days 
The proportion of hip fracture operations within 2 days is the percentage of patients with a fracture 
neck of femur primary diagnoses (ICD10: S720-S722) that have received a related procedure (W 
code) within two days.  
 
WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? experience  
The patient experience measures are based on the 2009 NHS Inpatient Survey for the Care Quality 
Commission which is administered to a random sample of patients in all acute trusts.  The variables 
are derived from three questions to patients:  ? ? “/ŶǇŽƵƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŚŽǁ clean was the hospital room or 
ǁĂƌĚ ? ? ?ůĞĂŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƌŽŽŵ ?ǁĂƌĚ ? ?dŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞŽŶĞŽĨĨŝǀĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ PǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂŶ ?
fairly clean, not very clean, not at all clean. Dr Foster measures the proportion of patients who found 
ƚŚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůŽƌ ƌŽŽŵǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂŶŽƌĐůĞĂŶ ?  ? ?  “tĞƌĞǇŽƵ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐǇŽƵǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽďĞ ŝŶ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚǇŽƵƌĐĂƌĞĂŶĚ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?  ?/ŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?dŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚĂŶƐǁĞƌ PǇĞƐ ?
definitely; yes, to some extent; no. Dr Foster measures the proportion of patients who answered 
ǇĞƐ ?  ? ? “ŝĚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚƌƵƐƚ ŝŶƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐƚ ĞĂƚŝŶŐǇŽƵ ?  ?dƌƵƐƚ ŝŶƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?dŚĞ
patient could answer: yes, always; yes, sometimes; no. Dr Foster measures the percentage of 
patients who answered yes.   
 
 
 
Appendix B
Model of competition, market size, and quality under xed
prices
This appendix sketches a simple model of a market for hospital care in which hospitals
face regulated prices and compete for patients via their choice of quality. The model
develops the standard circular road specication of Vickrey (1964) and Salop (1979) which
is also the basis for the papers on competition and quality by Gravelle (1999) and Brekke
et al (2011).
1 Model
Consider a market for hospital treatment where n hospitals are equidistantly located on
a circle with circumference of length L. H identical patients are distributed uniformly
around the circle with density h = H/L Locations of hospitals and patients are dened
by their clockwise distance from an arbitrary origin on the circle. Each patient demands
at most one unit of treatment. The utility of a patient who is located at w and is treated
at hospital i, located at zi, is
U (w, zi) = v − t |w − zi|+ qi, (1)
where qi is the quality at hospital i, t is the transportation cost per unit of distance
travelled, and V is the gross valuation of treatment. We assume v is large enough that all
patients choose to be treated.
The distance between hospitals is equal to L/n. The patient who is indi¤erent between
seeking treatment at hospital i located at zi and the neighbouring hospital i − 1 located
at zi −
L
n
, is located at w−i , dened by v − t
w−i − zi+ qi = v − t w−i − (zi − Ln )+ q1−1,
so that
w−i = zi −

tL
n
+ qi − qi−1

1
2t
= zi −

L
2n
+
qi − qi−1
2t

Similarly patients at
w+i =

qi − qi+1 +
t
n

L
2t
− zi =
L
2n
+
qi − qi+1
2t
− zi
are indi¤erent between hospital i and hospital i+ 1 located at zi +
L
n
.
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Total demand facing hospital i from both segments is1
Di = D (qi, q−1, qi+1) = h
 
w+i − w
−
i

=
H
n
+
h
t

qi −
qi−1 + qi+1
2

, (2)
so that
∂Di
∂qi
=
h
t
(3)
A higher total population H implies a higher demand and an increase in quality increases
demand more when population density h = H/L is higher.
Hospitals are prospectively nanced by a third-party payer o¤ering a per-treatment
price p and a lump-sum transfer T . The cost function is C(xi, qi) where xi is the number of
patients treated, with Cx > 0, Cq > 0, Cxx ≥ 0, Cqq > 0 and Cxq ≶ 0. The last assumption
means that we allow for both cost substitutability (Cxq > 0) and cost complementarity
(Cxq < 0) between quality and output. We assume that hospitals meet their demand Di
generated by their quality and the quality of their neighbouring hospitals. We assume
that p > Cx to ensure that treating more patients at given quality will increase prot.
The objective function of hospital i is
π = T + pD (qi, q−1, qi+1qi, q−1, qi+1)− C (D (qi, q−1, qi+1) , qi) = π(qi, q−1, qi+1; ) (4)
Altruistic concerns for patients could be incorporated into the model by assuming that
the hospital gets utility A(xi, qi) from treating xi patients with quality qi and writing the
utility function as ui = πi +Ai = T + pDi − C
∗(Di, qi) where C
∗ = C −A.
Hospitals simultaneously and independently choose their qualities to maximise (4) so
that the rst order condition is
πqi = [p− Cx(Di(qi, qi−1, qi+1), qi)]
∂Di
∂qi
− Cq(Di(qi, qi−1, qi+1), qi)
= [p− Cx(Di(qi, qi−1, qi+1), qi)]
h
t
− Cq(Di(qi, qi−1, qi+1), qi) = 0 (5)
The second-order condition is
πqiqi = −
∂Di
∂qi

Cxx
∂Di
∂qi
+ 2Cxq

− Cqq
= −
h
t

Cxx
h
t
+ 2Cxq

− Cqq < 0 (6)
With rms identical except for location there is a symmetric equilibrium with all rms
choosing the same quality qe provided that either Cxq 6= 0 or Cqq 6= 0.
2. The symmetric
1We restrict attention to congurations of quality across hospitals where it is never the case that a
patient will wish to choose a hospital other than one of the two nearest.
2We must assume that either Cqq 6= 0 or Cqx 6= 0 otherwise an equilibrium will not exist. With both
Cqq = 0 and Cqx = 0, so that the cost function is C = g(x) + δq, the marginal prot from quality when
all rms choose the same quality so that xi = H/n for all i, is (p − g
′(H/n))(h/t) − δ which is constant
with respect to qi. Apart from the knife edge case in which (p− g
′(H/n))(h/t) = δ, every rm will want
to increase or decrease quality so that all rms having the same quality cannot be an equilibrium.
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equilibrium satises
πqi = [p− Cx(Di(q
e, qe, qe), qe)]
∂Di
∂qi
− Cq(Di(q
e, qe, qe), qe) = 0 (7)
where ∂Di/∂qi = h/t > 0. Equilibrium quality q
e is found by substituting (2)-(3) into (7)
and setting qi = qi−1 = qi+1 = q
e.
1.1 Constant marginal cost
With cost function C = cx+ 12δq
2 the equilibrium quality is:
qe =
h
δt
(p− c) =
H
δtL
(p− c) (8)
so that equilibrium quality under monopolistic competition is not a¤ected by the number
of rms but increases with the population density and decreases with transport cost ,
provided that price exceeds marginal treatment cost: ∂qe/∂n = 0, ∂qe/∂h > 0, ∂qe/∂t < 0.
An increase in the number of providers has no e¤ect on quality: a increase in the
number of providers reduces demand for each provider but does not alter the marginal
benet of quality.A lower transportation costs increases quality because it increases the
responsiveness of demand to quality.
A higher population increases quality. The intuition is analogous to that for a lower
transportation cost: a higher population increases the demand increase from an increase
in quality.
The econometric implication of the dependence of quality on population density is that
if density is not controlled for in the regression model, the estimated e¤ect of variables
with which it is correlated will be biased. In particular, if the number of providers is
positively correlated with the population density, then the e¤ect of competition, measured
by the number of providers in a market, will biased upward.
1.2 Increasing marginal cost
With cost function is C = 12cx
2 + 12δq
2
i , equilibrium quality is
qe =
h
δt

p− c
H
n

=
H
δtL

p− c
H
n

(9)
Now an increase in the number of providers increases quality, again providing that price
exceeds marginal treatment cost. With more providers, each provider treats fewer patients
and, because marginal cost of treatment is increasing in the number of patients, the mar-
ginal cost of treatment is reduced, so that the marginal prot from higher quality, after
allowing for the resulting increase in numbers treated, is higher with more providers. A
higher number of providers now increases quality: an increase in the number of providers
reduces the marginal treatment cost and makes a marginal benet of quality more prof-
itable.
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The e¤ect of an inrease in the total population H is ambigous:
∂qe
∂H
=
1
δtL

p− 2c
H
n

≷ 0 (10)
On one hand, higher population implies a larger number of patients who are willing to
shift when quality increases. On the other hand, it implies a higher marginal treatment
cost which reduces the marginal prot from higher quality. margin. Depending on which
of the two e¤ects is larger, quality may increase or decrease.
The e¤ect of an increase in the geographical size of the market as captured by the
circumference L, keeping the population H constant, is unambiguously negative
∂qe
∂L
= −
H
δtL2

p− 2c
H
n

< 0 (11)
Thus less densely populated markets have lower quality than markets with the same pop-
ulation but higher population density. The reason is that when the geographical size of
the market L increases, hospitals are further apart and patients have on average to incur
higher travel costs to access a hospital. An increase in quality by a hospital will therefore
attract fewer additional patients so that the marginal revenue from quality is reduced.
1.3 Non separable cost function
The rst two examples assume that the cost of additional quality is independent of the
number of patients treated. For example, quality is improved by investments in better
software for record keeping or in greater investment in better trained sta¤. Now suppose
that the cost of quality depends on the number of patients treated. For example, quality
is improved by employing more sta¤ per patient. With the cost function C = γxαq (α ≥ 1)
we have Cx >, Cxx ≥ 0, Cq > 0, Cxq > 0. Equilibrium quality is
qe =
p
δ
 n
H
α−1
−
tL
nα
=
p
δ
 n
H
α−1
−
tH
hnα
(12)
which is decreasing in t and total population but increasing in the number of rms and
the density of population.
1.4 General cost function
With a general cost function the symmetric equilibrium qe is dened implicitly by the rst
order condition on quality (5) evaluated at qei = q
e, i = 1, ..., n)
f(qe, H, t, L, p, n) =
H
tL

p− Cx

H
n
, qe

− Cq

H
n
, qe

= 0 (13)
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Thus for some parameter k,3
∂qe
∂k
= −
fk(q
e, H, t, L, p, n)
fqe(qe, H, t, L, p, n)
(14)
Now
fqe(q
e, H, t, L, p, n) = −

H
tL
Cxq

H
n
, qe

+ Cqq

H
n
, qe

(15)
and the existence of a symmetric equilibrium (see footnote 1) requires either Cxq 6= 0 or
Cqq 6= 0. To avoid perverse comparative statics we assume that fqe < 0, which requires
either Cxq > 0 or Cqq > 0.
Increases in t reduce quality, provided the requlated price exceeds marginal cost,
∂qe
∂t
= −
1
fqe
H
t2L
(p− Cx) (16)
The e¤ect of increase in the number of rms is
∂qe
∂n
= −
1
fqe

H
tL
Cxx
H
n2
+ Cqx
H
n2

(17)
which is positive if marginal treatment cost is increasing and the marginal cost of treatment
greater with higher quality. The e¤ect of an increase in population is
∂qe
∂H
=
−1
fqe

1
tL
(p− Cx)−
H
tL
Cxx
1
n
− Cqx
1
n

(18)
which is ambiguous without further assumptions about the cost function. However, an
increase in the geographical market size (L) reduces quality if price exceeds marginal
treatment cost
∂qe
∂L
=
−1
fqe

−
H
tL2
(p− Cx)

< 0 (19)
2 Free entry
Prot for every rm in the symmetric equilibrium (qei = q
e, i = 1, ..., n) is
π(qei , q
e
i−1, q
e
i+1; ) = π
e(n,H) = T + p
H
n
− C

H
n
, qe(n,H)

(20)
where qe(n,H) is given by (13) which is the rst order condtion (5) evaluated at qei = q
e,
i = 1, ..., n).
3Note that at the equilibrium a parameter change will change all rms qualities equally and leave
demand unchanged. Thus the e¤ect of a parameter change in equilibrium (with the number of rms xed)
is not given by total di¤erentiaton of the rst order condition (5) holding the qualities of other rms
constant.
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The e¤ect of the number of the providers n on the equilibrium prot is
∂πe
∂n
= −(p− Cx)
H
n2
− Cq
∂qe
∂n
H
n2
= −(p− Cx)
H
n2
− Cq
(Cxx + Cqx)
Cqq + Cqx
H
tL
H
n2
(21)
which is negative as long as the price is above the marginal cost and the cost function is
su¢ciently convex in quantity. Note that the marginal e¤ect of n on equilibrium prot
is the sum of the direct e¤ect of n plus the indirect e¤ect through the induced change
in quality. If the quality of all other providers was being held constant this latter term
would be zero because the rm chooses its quality to maximise quality, given the qualtiy
level of its rivals which it takes as given in the Nash equilibrium. But the change in n
induces changes in the qualities of all rms so that the envelope theorem does not apply
and the indirect e¤ect is not zero.4
Intuitively, a higher numbers of providers reduces demand which reduces prots (rst
term) and moreover it increases quality thanks to the lower marginal cost (second term).
Therefore, overall more entry reduces protability. With free entry and exit, the equilib-
rium number of providers ne is the number of providers such that equilibrium prot is
zero:
πe(ne, H) = T + p
H
ne
− C

H
ne
, qe(ne, H)

= 0 (22)
Totally di¤erentiating the above condition, we investigate the e¤ect of H on ne :
∂πe
∂ne
dne +
∂πe
∂H
dH = 0
or, more extensively,
dne
dH
=
−πeH
πen
=
1
ne
(p− Cx)− Cq
∂qe
∂Hh
(p− Cx) + Cq
∂qe
∂ne
i
H
(ne)2
=
1
ne
(p− Cx)− Cq
(p−Cx)−
1
n [Cxx
H
tL
+Cqx]
Cqq+Cqx
H
tLh
(p− Cx) + Cqe
(Cxx+Cqx)
Cqq+Cqx
i
H
(ne)2
(23)
A higher population density increases the protability of the market and encourages
entry (rst term in the numerator). However, population density also a¤ects quality
(second term in the numerator). If quality is higher then it reduces prot; if it is lower it
increases prot. Whether quality increases or decreases depends on two opposite e¤ects:
on one hand, higher demand generates an incentive to compete more ercely on quality; on
the other hand, higher demand increases the marginal cost which tends to reduce quality.
Depending on the assumptions about the cost function it is possible that markets with
larger populations will have more or less competition (more or fewer providers). We have
also seen in section 1.4 that markets with more providers can have higher or lower quality.
4The e¤ect of n on equilibrium quality is given by the implicit di¤erentiation of the rst order condition
on quality evaluated at equilibrium qualities for all providers (13).
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Thus empirical analyses need to take account of population size in markets. Failing to
include a measure of population in the regression of quality on competition could lead to a
biased estimate of the e¤ect of competition on quality. If larger population leads to both
an increase in the number of providers and quality then omitting population from the
regression model will bias the estimated e¤ect of the number of rms on quality upwards.
Similar potential omitted variable bias arises from the e¤ect of other aspects of market
size, such as population density or market area (captured in these models by L).
3 Extensions
The current model assumes that providers always meet the demand. In further work we
plan to investigate the relationship between competition and quality when, as is the case
in the NHS and many other public health care systems, there is rationing by waiting. If
we retain the Vickrey (1964) circular market model, this requires specifying preferences
over quality and waiting times to derive demand functions D(qi, qi−1, qi+1, ωi, ωi−1 , ωi+1)
where the waiting time ωi for provider i is dened by D(qi, qi−1, qi+1, ωi, ωi−1, ωi+1) = xi
and providers choose quality and supply (xi) thus determining waiting times (or quality
and waiting times thus determining supply).
It seems likely that the market will exhibit two types of equilibrium: one with positive
waiting times and zero quality (if p is small enough) and another (if p is high enough)
with zero waiting times and positive quality which is equivalent to the model above. It
seems unlikely that there can be both positive waiting times and positive (above minimum)
quality in equiliberium with providers who are motivated solely by prot. If a provider
with positive quality and waiting time reduces its quality, keeping its supply constant, so
that its waiting time falls to equate demand to its supply, then it will have an unchanged
revenue and its costs will be lower. Thus equilibria with postive quality and waiting times
require, in the deterministic waiting time framework, that providers are partially altruistic.
In these types of specication it is likely that the role of the budget constraint on hospitals
will become important.
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